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DECRIMINALIZING THE MARIJUANA USER: 
A DRAFTER'S GUIDE 
Richard J. Bonnie* 
In 1972, the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse rec-
ommended decriminalization of possession of marijuana for personal 
use. 1 Since that time, ten states2 have enacted some variant of the Com-
mission's recommendation, and similar proposals are currently being 
considered in most of the remaining states and in Congress. 3 This article 
is designed to survey and discuss the numerous issues of policy and law 
which must be confronted in evaluating legislative proposals to implement 
the Commission's recommendation. 
The article does not discuss the arguments in favor of decriminaliza-
tion, a matter which the author' and others5 have covered elsewhere. Nor 
does the article consider the even more difficult questions involved in a 
legislative decision to legalize the drug and authorize its distribution for 
nonmedical uses. International obligations, federal law, and current polit-
ical realities preclude enactment of a regulatory approach toward the 
availability of marijuana, including any variant of the so-called alcohol 
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sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, under Grant Number 76-
Nl-99--0075. 
Professor Bonnie gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Patrick Noonan 
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1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL 
OF MISUNDERSTANDING 150-60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MARIHUANA COMMISSION RE-
PORT.] 
2 ALASKA STAT.§ 17.12.010 (1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11357 (West Supp. 
1976); Cow. REV. STAT.§ 12-22-412 (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2383 (Supp. 
1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 152.15 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN.§§ 41-29-139, 
41-29-149 (Supp. 1977); Marihuana Reform Act, ch. 360, 1977 N.Y. Laws 500; N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§§ 90-95, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2925.03 (Page 
Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.207. 
3 The Senate Judiciary Committee recently approved a compromise version of S. 1437, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), the long-pending proposal to overhaul the federal criminal 
code. S. 1437 includes a provision which would make possession of one ounce or less a 
"criminal infraction." The Washington Star, Nov. 2, 1977, at A-6. See note 65 infra. 
4 See Marihuana Research and Legal Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Alcoholism and Narcotics of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 134-74 (1974) (testimony of Richard J. Bonnie); R. BONNIE & C. WHITEBREAD, THE 
MARIHUANA CONVICTION 294-304 (1974). 
5 See, e.g., J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); A. HELLMAN, LAWS 
AGAINST MARIJUANA: THE PRICE WE PAY (1975). 
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model. 6 Although a state conceivably could repeal its laws against cultiva-
tion and distribution of marijuana, including only the federal prohibitions 
in effect, such an overt departure from prevailing national sentiment 
seems unlikely. One must assume, for present purposes, that commercial 
activities will remain prohibited by state law. 
Within these contours, the range of public policy choices has both 
statutory and administrative dimensions. The statutory issues involve the 
appropriate penalty structure for possession of marijuana for personal use 
and other consumption-related behavior. Possible sanctions include crim-
inal penalties of varying severity as well as several forms of decriminaliza-
tion, including civil sanctions. Although administrative choices by police 
and prosecutors are extrem~ly important and should not be overlooked by 
reformers,7 this article will focus only on legislative options, providing a 
drafter's guide for lawmakers who have concluded that the traditional 
criminal penalties for consumption-related behavior should be substan-
tially modified. 
Decriminalization has been used to describe these legislative reforms, 
but, because the operational meaning of the criminal sanction is itself 
ambiguous, neither legislators nor criminal justice personnel share a 
common conception of what decriminalization means. In this article, the 
term will be employed to refer to a threshold concept rather than a 
definitional one: decriminalization refers to any statutory scheme under 
which the least serious marijuana-related behavior is not punishable by 
incarceration. Incarceration is a useful threshold device for several 
reasons: the elimination of the possibility of imprisonment and its atten-
dant social stigma reflects a significant change in official attitudes toward 
marijuana offenses; total confinement is a sanction different in kind as 
well as in degree from other legal sanctions; and a lesser sanction suggests 
or requires less severe and less elaborate criminal processes. 
Beyond this threshold, two important questions must be addressed. 
First, legislators must decide what behavior should be decriminalized. 
Only possession of small amounts? Nonprofit accommodation sales to 
friends? Cultivation of a few plants in the home? These questions will be 
addressed in Part I. 
6 An analysis of the various regulatory mechanisms for making marijuana available 
legitimately for recreational users appears in MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
I, at App. Vol. II, 1179-84. 
7 Whatever the prescribed penalties for commercial activities on the one hand and 
consumption-related activities on the other, enforcement officials at each level must also 
make decisions concerning the implementation of these prohibitions. These enforcement 
choices include allocations of investigative resources, guidelines for responses by uniformed 
patrolmen to detected violations, and guidelines for exercises of prosecutorial discretion. 
To the extent that the governor and other policymakers at the state level can influence the 
behavior of local police and prosecutors, decisions regarding enforcement priorities and 
practices can substantially reduce the social costs of prohibitory policies. Also, because 
they may be implemented without the heightened public visibility associated with the 
legislative process, administrative choices may substantially alter the operation of the legal 
system without sacrificing the deterrent benefits of the prohibition and incurring the sym-
bolic costs of repeal. These costs include both decreased deterrence as well as heightened 
anxieties among those who are frightened by the change. See generally R. BONNIE & C. 
WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 273-293. 
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Second, legislators must determine what residual sanctions, if any, 
should be retained to implement the state's interest in discouraging de-
criminalized behavior. Conduct that is decriminalized may or may not 
remain subject to lesser sanctions. In each of the ten states which have 
thus far enacted decriminalization reforms, least serious marijuana-
related behavior is still punishable by a fine. In some of those states the 
behavior is still labeled a criminal offense, although a person convicted of 
the offense may have no record. Should the commission of a de-
criminalized offense be punishable by a monetary penalty or by participa-
tion in some educational or counseling program? Should the person be 
booked and taken into custody after detection of a decriminalized of-
fense? Should such a person be stigmatized by an arrest or conviction 
record? These questions will be addressed in Parts II, III and IV. 
I. DECRIMINALIZED OFFENSES 
The scope of decriminalized behavior, and the drafting techniques used 
to define the residual offenses, will be determined primarily by the pur-
pose of the reform. If, for reasons of fairness, justice, or institutional 
integrity, the legislature's main goal is to withdraw the criminal sanction 
from mere consumers of marijuana, the statutes should be revised in a 
way that most accurately distinguishes between consumption-related ac-
tivity and commercial activity. On the other hand, if the primary legisla-
tive objective is to promote the efficient administration of criminal justice 
by reducing the burden of processing petty marijuana cases, decriminali-
zation may be restricted to the narrowest range of behavior consistent 
with this goal. 
Drug offenses are usually separately defined for possessory conduct, 
distributional conduct, and production or cultivation. Legislators have 
traditionally recognized that possessory activity may be indicative of 
either intended consumption or intended distribution, depending upon the 
amount possessed and other indicia of intent. Similarly, legislators have 
been sufficiently aware of the patterns of marijuana use that they have 
distinguished since the late 1960's between purely commercial activity 
and gratuitous or nonprofit transfers among friends. A similar distinction 
may be drawn between forms of cultivation, which may range from 
growing one plant in a window box to a large-scale agricultural enterprise. 
This Part will consider the drafting alternatives for defining de-
criminalized or least serious marijuana-related behavior with reference to 
possessory conduct, noncommercial transfers, and noncommercial culti-
vation. 
A. Possessory Conduct 
l. Statutory Relationships Between Intent and Amount-Traditionally, 
the possession offense has been divided into at least two categories: 
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simple possession and possession with intent to sell, with more severe 
penalties authorized for the latter category. A clear legislative trend in 
recent years has been to dispense with proof of intent and to substitute 
gradations of amount with correspondingly graduated penalties. Thus, in 
discriminating between less serious and more serious possessory activity, 
legislatures can utilize two criteria, intent to sell and amount possessed, 
which can be combined in several different ways. 
Under one statutory scheme, the pure intent approach, possession of 
any amount of marijuana is decriminalized unless the prosecution proves 
intent to sell. The principal advantage of this approach is that it reflects 
the essential difference between commercial activity8 and possession for 
personal consumption. The primary drawback is that the prosecution 
rarely has any independent evidence of intent to sell and usually relies 
entirely on inferences drawn from the amount of marijuana possessed. 
Because noncriminal and criminal conduct are difficult to distinguish, the 
pure intent approach does little to reduce the cost or enhance the fairness 
of enforcing marijuana prohibitions. 9 The user cannot confidently adjust 
his conduct to avoid criminal sanctions. Criminal justice resources may 
be unnecessarily squandered if the police cannot recognize the de-
criminalized offense when they see it, although the promulgation of pro-
secutorial charging guidelines can solve this problem. In addition, defen-
dants charged with criminal possession are more likely to insist on a trial 
under the pure intent approach because the prosecutor must prove actual 
intent, a more difficult task than proving that the amount possessed 
exceeded a designated quantity. Since the defendant has a greater chance 
of prevailing under the pure intent approach than under a strict amount 
approach, the prosecutor will not have as much leverage for plea bargain-
ing. 
A variation of the pure intent approach which shifts the burden of proof 
to the defendant may increase the prosecutor's leverage. Under this 
approach, possession of any amount is presumed to be criminal unless the 
defendant proves that the possession was solely for personal use. 10 Al-
though the question is unsettled, this approach may be unconstitutional: it 
may not satisfy the constitutional requirement that the state prove each 
8 Commercial activity refers only to transfers in which the transferor realizes a profit. It 
may be more appropriate to place casual, not-for-profit transfers in the same category as 
mere possessory activity. See text at notes 42-46 infra. 
9 This is not so serious a drawback in ordinary legislative grading among felonies and 
other serious criminal offenses: the entire range of conduct is punishable by imprisonment 
and the criminal process will proceed in the same manner regardless of which offense the 
person has really committed. However, when the lesser offense is decriminalized, the 
violator is either not subject to punishment or his case will be processed in a significantly 
different way. For this reason it is more important to employ objective criteria in drawing 
statutory lines. The expanding use of citations and other less burdensome procedural 
devices in misdemeanor cases calls for clearer lines between misdemeanors and related 
felonies as well. 
10 By increasing the prosecutor's leverage, this approach will probably conserve pro-
secutorial and judicial resources. It will do nothing to reduce the costs associated with police 
enforcement, however, since every possessor will remain a potential criminal. Moreover, 
this approach does not alleviate unfairness to possessors of mairjuana who will never be sure 
whether they can rebut the presumption and escape criminal liability. 
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element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt;11 and there may be an 
insufficient connection between the proven fact, possession of any 
amount, and the apparently presumed fact, intent to distribute. 12 It may 
be argued, in response, that since the legislature is constitutionally enti-
tled to classify simple possession of any amount of marijuana as a crime, 
it can, a fortiori, create what is in effect a reduced offense for cases in 
which the offender can demonstrate his intent to consume. On the other 
hand, if the legislature has chosen to employ the offenders' purpose as the 
central element in distinguishing criminal conduct from noncriminal con-
duct, it may be required to assign the burden of proof in a way which 
bears some empirical connection to the offenders' actual state of mind. 
Thus, unless statutory presumptions are based on the amount possessed, 
the legislature may be constitutionally bound, in effect, to presume intent 
to consume from the mere fact of possession of any amount of marijuana 
or not to presume anything at all, defining mere possession without any 
intent as the offense. 
However the constitutional issue is resolved, it is clear that de-
criminalization of possession only if the violator proves that his intent is 
to consume will not result in any major change in the operation of 
marijuana laws. Not surprisingly, none of the ten states which have thus 
far adopted decriminalization provisions have employed either version of 
the pure intent approach. 13 
A second method of drawing the statutory boundaries for possessory 
activity is to decriminalize possession of less than a specified amount and 
to retain the criminal penalty for possession of any quantity exceeding 
that amount, without regard to intent to sell. Nine of the ten states which 
have decriminalized marijuana have utilized this pure amount approach. 14 
The principal advantages of this scheme are fairness and efficiency: 
defining the offense by the amount possessed permits both possessors and 
police to know precisely what conduct is criminally prohibited; moreover, 
this approach gives the prosecutor greater leverage to plea bargain with 
11 Compare Mullaney v. Willbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) with Patterson v. New York, 45 
U.S.L.W. 4708 (June 17, 1977). See Cole v. State, 511 P.2d 593 (Oki. Crim. App. 1973), 
where the court invalidated a possession of paraphernalia statute on the theory that mere 
possession is a neutral fact from which one cannot fairly infer an illegal purpose, and 
therefore the state cannot in effect shift the burden to the defendant to prove that his 
intentions were innocent. But see State v. Garcia, 16 N.C.App. 344, 192 S.E.2d 2 (1972), in 
which the court upheld a statute providing that possession of more than five grams of 
marijuana raised a presumption of intent to distribute. 
12 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Cf. Sharp v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 
269, 192 S.E.2d 217 (1972), where the court invalidated a statutory provision which permit-
ted the fact-finder to base a finding of intent to distribute solely upon evidence as to the 
quantity of marijuana unlawfully possessed. 
13 The Alaska statute does employ the pure intent approach for possession of marijuana in 
the home, using a pure amount approach for possession in public. See note 14 infra .. 
14 ALASKA STAT.§§ 17.12.IIO(d), (e) (1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11357(b) 
(West Supp. 1976); Cow. REV. STAT.§ 12-22-412(12)(a) (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
22, § 2383, tit. 17-A, § 1106(3) (Supp. 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(d)(2) (Supp. 
1977); Marihuana Reform Act, ch. 360, § 3, 1977 N.Y. Laws 500; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 
90-95(d)(4) as amended by Act of 1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws; OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2925.03 (Page Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.202. 
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those who possess above-the-line amounts. On the other hand, the 
method may. be at once over and underinclusive: it may decriminalize the 
behavior of some sellers who possess amounts below-the-line and may 
retain criminal penalties for some consumers who possess above-the-line 
quantities. 15 The respective degrees of over and underinclusion obviously 
depend upon where the line is drawn. 
If a legislature is impressed with the advantages of the pure amount 
method but wishes to alleviate either the underinclusion or the overinclu-
sion, it may select a scheme which combines the intent and amount 
approaches. There are four basic variations on this theme. The first errs in 
the direction of underinclusion. If the major impetus behind decriminali-
zation is a desire to reduce the administrative costs of processing most 
petty consumption offenses, then the statutory amount could be relatively 
small and the law could be drafted to make possession of above-the-line 
amounts always criminal and possession of below-the-line amounts crim-
inal only if the prosecution proves intent to distribute. In below-the-line 
cases, however, such a statute will involve the same problems of fairness 
and cost as the pure intent approach since the seriousness of the posses-
sor's offense is indeterminate at the time of the offense in the absence of 
definitive prosecutorial guidelines. The main advantage of this combined 
approach is that police and prosecutors may utilize evidence of intent 
against dealers who are careful to possess only below-the-line amounts. 
Also, a criminal above-the-line offense will give the prosecutor a plea 
bargaining tool for persons charged with possession with intent to sell. 
A second combined approach errs in the direction of overinclusion. If 
the core objective is to ameliorate the unfairness of criminalization of an 
activity which is engaged in and approved of by a large segment of the 
populace, a larger statutory amount could be used and possession of 
below-the-line amounts would always be noncriminal while above-the-
line possession would be noncriminal unless the prosecution proved in-
tent to distribute. 
If the legislature believes that this approach will permit commercial 
dealers to avoid prosecution by limiting their possession to below-the-line 
amounts or will generate too many contested cases due to the pro-
secutor's reduced leverage, the statute could presume intent to distribute 
in above-the-line cases, in effect shifting the burden of proving intent 
to consume to the defendant in such cases. This third variation was 
adopted by Maine in its decriminalization statute. 16 Although similar 
statutes have been challenged on constitutional grounds, they have gen-
erally been upheld on the theory that the proven fact, the amount pos-
15 Since this method does not i,nvolve pre.sumptions of intent to sell, no constitutional 
challenge can be mounted on the basis of denial of either the privilege against self-
incrimination or the presumption of innocence. Moreover, it has been held, despite a 
substantive due process attack, that there is a rational basis for grading the seriousness of 
the offense according to the weight of the marijuana possessed. See People v. Kline, 16 Ill. 
App. 3d 1017, 307 N.E. 2d 398 (1974); People v. Campbell, 16 Ill. App. 3d 851, 307 N.E.2d 
395 (1974). 
16 ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1106(3) (Supp. 1975). 
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sessed, is rationally related to the presumed fact, intent to distribute.17 
However, a Michigan court invalidated a statute which provided that 
possession of more than two ounces of marijuana raised a presumption of 
intent to sell based on its finding that the specified amount was inadequate 
to support the presumption. 18 Again, the constitutional question is a 
tangled one, and extensive treatment is not warranted here. The soundest 
position seems to be that the legislature may employ any amount it 
chooses as a grading variable, decriminalizing possession of less than that 
an;10unt, but if it chooses to link the amount with the violator's purpose, 
making the latter the ultimate issue for grading purposes, then it must 
assign the burden of proof in a way which bears a reasonable relationship 
to the amount possessed. For example, a statute which decriminalized 
possession of less than five grams but decriminalized possession of more 
than five grams only if the defendant proved intent to consume might be 
invalid, whereas a similar statute using four ounces as the grading variable 
would be clearly constitutional. 
A statute combining the intent and amount criteria in this way, when 
compared with the pure amount approach, has the advantage of providing 
the possessor with an opportunity to contest the presumed fact of his 
intent to distribute. The person who possesses marijuana for personal use 
only, in amounts near the borderline, may be criminally punished if the 
quantity is slightly in excess of the designated amount. The disadvantage 
of this approach is that intent to distribute will be a triable issue in every 
case, even when the police are convinced that it was not intended solely 
for personal use; some retail dealers may thus be able to avoid serious 
sanctions even if they are detected in possession of small above-the-line 
quantities. Policymakers wishing to alleviate this problem and still retain 
the advantage of the combined intent-amount approach could create a 
buffer zone. This fourth variation will set two amounts, X and Y, so that 
possession of less than X will never be a criminal offense, while posses-
sion of more than Y will always be a criminal offense. Possession of more 
than X but less than Y will be criminal only if the prosecution proves 
intent to sell. 19 
2. Designating the Amount-If a legislature has decided to de-
criminalize some marijuana-related behavior and intends to implement 
that choice by utilizing at least one specific amount, the legislators must 
also decide what that specific amount will be and whether a distinction 
should be drawn between different cannabis products. 
Determining a statutory amount is. necessarily somewhat arbitrary. It is 
clear that a person possessing over a kilogram of marijuana is holding it 
17 See. e.g., Stone v. State, 254 Ark. 1011, 498 S.W.2d 634 (1973); State v. Garcia, 16 
N.C. App. 344, 192 S.E.2d 2 (1972). 
18 People v. Serra, 55 Mich. App. 514, 223 N.W.2d 28 (1974) (alternative holding). This 
aspect of Serra was reaffirmed in People v. Gallagher, 68 Mich. App. 63, 241 N.W.2d 759 
(1976). 
19 Again, the burden of disproving intent to sell might be shifted to the defendant, but this 
alternative may be subject to constitutional challenge if there is a major difference in the 
applicable penalty. See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra. 
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for sale and that one holding less than half an ounce is holding it for his 
personal use and perhaps the use of his friends. Between these extremes, 
however, there is no single amount for decriminalization which is a priori 
more appropriate than another. 
The precise amount should reflect the legislature's specific goal of 
decriminalization. If the goal is merely to reduce petty nuisance arrests 
and to retain the criminal sanction for as much marijuana-related conduct 
as possible, then a relatively small amount, such as one ounce, should be 
chosen. Since ninety to ninety-five percent of all arrests are for simple 
possession and approximately two-thirds of these involve one ounce or 
less,20 decriminalizing possession of one ounce or less will significantly 
reduce enforcement costs. The one-ounce amount also conforms to cur-
rent patterns ofretail distribution of marijuana. 21 Of the ten states which 
have decriminalized some marijuana-related behavior, six fixed the 
amount at one ounce, 22 one used twenty-five grams, an amount slightly 
less than an ounce,23 and two others decided on an ounce and a half.24 
If, on the other hand, legislators want the statutory amount to approxi-
mate the distinction between commercial and consumer behavior, one 
ounce is too low, although available data about use and distribution 
patterns do not indicate clearly which amount would be most realistic. It 
has been shown both in free access studies, where marijuana users are 
kept under observation and told to smoke as much as they wish, and in 
survey 1studies, where users are asked how much marijuana they con-
sume, that even a heavy user will not use more than an ounce of 
marijuana in a week. 25 Yet, many persons engaging in strictly consumer 
activity, including casual, not-for-profit distribution to friends, frequently 
possess more than one ounce because the drug is usually smoked com-
munally and because many users hold a supply for longer periods than 
one week. If a legislature wishes to keep users out of the criminal justice 
system, it should probably draw the line at about four ounces. In Ohio, 
possession of less than 100 grams, a little more than three and a half 
ounces, was decriminalized.26 
One problem which a higher amount leaves unresolved is that of the 
commercially oriented retailer who deals only in amounts of four ounces 
or less, returning to his secreted supply for frequent replenishment. A 
20 Goode, Sociological Aspects of Marijuana Use, 4 CoNTEMP. DRUG PRoe. 397, 441 
(1975). 
21 See MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at App. Vol. II 1173-74. 
22 ALASKA STAT.§ 17.12.IIO(d) (1975); Cal. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11357(b) (West 
Supp. 1976); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-22-412(12)(a) (Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 
41-29-139(d)(2) (Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(d)(4) as amended by Act of 1977, 
ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws; OR. REv. STAT. § 167.202. 
23 Marihuana Reform Act, ch. 369 § 3, 1977 N. Y. Laws 501. 
24 ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1106(3) (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.01(16) 
(West Supp. 1976). 
25 Telephone conversation with Dr. Robert Willette, National Institute on Drug Abuse 
(Oct. 15, 1976). 
26 OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. §2925.1 l(c)(3) (Page Supp. 1976). 
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buffer zone statute27 could be used to reach this situation: possession of 
less than one ounce could be decriminalized, while possession of more 
than four ounces remains a crime, and possession of an amount in the 
buffer zone would be a criminal offense if the prosecution proved intent to 
sell. 
3. The Potency Problem-Variability in the potency of marijuana poses 
an additional problem once the legislature has decided upon an amount. 
Different parts of the cannabis plant contain the psychoactive substance, 
delta-nine-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), in different proportions, gener-
ally decreasing in the following sequence: resin, flowers and leaves. 
Almost no THC is contained in the stems, roots, or seeds. 28 The level of 
THC also varies among plants depending upon agricultural conditions. 
For example, Mexican-grown marijuana usually contains one percent 
THC by weight; Colombian or Jamaican marijuana can contain as much 
as three to five percent THC; and marijuana grown domestically almost 
always contains less than one percent THC.29 Marijuana refers to a prep-
aration of the flowers, leaves, seeds, and small stems. Hashish, on the 
other hand, generally refers only to the resin and flowering tops of the 
plant, and its potency may range from one to fourteen percent THC. 
A decriminalization scheme might distinguish between preparations of 
varying potency in order to deter more effectively use of the more potent 
ones. Two methods for making this distinction have been proposed. The 
potency approach makes criminal liability entirely dependent upon the 
percentage of THC contained in the particular preparation. For example, 
possession of less than four ounces of any cannabis will no longer be a 
crime if the potency is less than one percent, but possession of any 
amount containing more than one percent THC remains a crime. 
The potency approach poses three basic problems: fairness, cost, and 
inconsistency with the goals of decriminalization. The fairness objection 
implicates the fundamental requirement of our criminal law that actus 
reus and mens rea coincide. Unless all consumers purchase the equip-
ment necessary to perform THC assays, a person smoking marijuana 
cannot know the potency of his supply, and a potency distinction there-
fore imposes the criminal sanction on one who could not have known he 
was committing a crime. 30 
Implementing a potency approach would also be costly for the state 
because each police department would be required to equip their chemical 
laboratories for THC assays. 31 Scientists at the National Institute on Drug 
27 See text at note 19 supra. 
28 See MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at App. Vol. II 1171. 
29 Goode, supra note 20, at 404. The author also notes that marijuana is rarely laced with 
more expensive and dangerous drugs, such as mescaline and opium, since these substances 
are unprofitably sold in this manner. Id. at 404-05. 
30 A potency distinction is not necessarily violative of due process. The Supreme Court 
has recently reaffirmed the constitutionality of strict liability regulatory offenses. United 
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
31 Alternatively, departments might pool their resources to establish a central lab, or the 
chemical evaluation could be done on the state level. However, considerable expense is 
involved both in setting up the apparatus and in conducting each assay, regardless of which 
alternative is chosen. 
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Abuse claim that the cost would be prohibitive even though it is now 
technologically feasible to assay every compound seized. 32 
The most serious objection to the potency approach is that it could 
undermine the benefits of decriminalization. Since any marijuana sample 
could contain an excessive percentage of THC, the police might be 
directed io detain all persons possessing marijuana pending chemical 
analysis. This could increase rather than reduce the expenditure of scarce 
police resources in enforcing marijuana laws. Further, the potency ap-
proach does not distinguish the commercial seller from the consumer, and 
it retains the potential for harrassment and selective enforcement which 
plagues the present system. Finally, the potency distinction may actually 
be insignificant. The Drug Enforcement Administration has analyzed 
street samples of marijuana compounds for the last several years, and 
virtually every sample has fallen within the one-half percent to one 
percent range, with a mean potency of six-tenths percent. 33 
Under the second method of distinguishing between samples of dif-
ferent potencies, the form approach, criminal penalties are imposed for 
the possession of hashish, resin, and flowering tops, but not for the 
usually less potent marijuana flowers, leaves, seeds, and small stems. 
There are two problems with the form approach. First, the form is not 
always correlated with potency. Some weak samples of hashish contain 
Jess THC than some strong marijuana compounds. 34 While the Drug 
Enforcement Administration has located hashish samples which contain 
as much as fourteen percent THC, the mean percentage is two and 
six-tenths percent, and two-thirds of the preparations analyzed were 
below this mean percentage. The person possessing weak hashish might 
successfully claim that a statute which punishes him while permitting a 
person possessing a more potent marijuana mixture to escape criminal 
liability is defective under the equal protection clause. Further, even if the 
potency-form relationship is close enough to survive constitutional chal-
lenge, it makes little sense as a matter of policy; since there is very little 
potency difference between the mean sample of each form, the distinction 
cannot be justified in terms of potentially disparate effects on health. 
A second objection to the form approach is a definitional one. Hashish 
is typically defined as the resin of the cannabis plant, 35 but as the 
Marihuana Commission pointed out: 
[R]ather than representing a clear physical distinction, "resin" is 
merely a convenient label for ascribing certain substances exuded by 
many plants, all of which have certain properties in common. For 
example, they are brittle in solid form and melt when heated. 
32 Telephone conversation with Dr. Robert Willette, National Institute on Drug Abuse 
(Oct. 15, 1976). 
33 Id. The DEA has found rare instances of compounds co11sisting of up to 5 % THC. 
34 See Goode, supra note 20, at 405. 
35 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-105(0) (Supp. 1976); "[T]he resin extracted from 
any part of the plants of the genus Cannabis and all species thereof or any preparation, 
mixture or derivative made from or with said resin." 
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The problem is that "marijuana" mixtures contain some resins and 
"hashish" preparations often contain plant parts other than resins. So, 
for legal purposes, resin is not the only factor. How could it be 
defined? Predominantly resin? Substantially resin? Any such formula-
tion might well fall to a vagueness attack. 36 
13 
Despite these objections, six of the ten states which have de-
criminalized some marijuana-related behavior have retained the criminal 
sanction for possession of any amount of hashish, and each relies on the 
form approach to make the necessary distinction. 37 Two additional states 
relied entirely on the form approach to decriminalize possession of dif-
ferent amounts of cannabis products: both Ohio and North Carolina 
decriminalized possession of l 00 grams of marijuana, five grams of hash-
ish, and one gram of hashish oil. 38 Only two of the reform jurisdictions, 
Alaska and Minnesota, decriminalized possession of .:qual amounts of 
cannabis products without regard to form or potency. 39 
If lawmakers are determined to exert a greater deterrent. against the use 
of the most potent preparations, the most sensible approach would be to 
distinguish between hashish oil and other forms of cannabis. Since hash-
ish oil is a liquid concentrate, this distinction would be a simple one to 
make for both users and police .. Furthermore, there is a significant dif-
ference in terms of average potency between hashish oil and the other two 
forms of the drug. While nearly all samples of both marijuana and hashish 
contained less than three percent THC in the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration study, the lowest potency found for hashish oil was ten percent, 
and the mean was seventeen percent. 40 Thus, hashish oil is easily defined 
in terms of both form and potency. 41 
B. Distributive Conduct 
The sale or distribution offense must be classified in two or more 
categories to distinguish adequately between commercial activity and 
36 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at App. Vol. II 1173. 
37 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 11065, 11018, 11357 (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. 
STAT.§§ 12-22-403 (1.5), (1.6)(4), 12-22-412(12)(d) (Supp. 1977); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A §§ 
1101( !), (5), 1102(2)(c), 4(b) (Supp. 1977) tit. 22, § 2383 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 
41-29-105(o)(r). 49-29-139, 41-29-149 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT.§ 474.010(13), (14), (15) 
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW§ 3302(5) (McKinney Supp. 1977). 
All states except New York rely on the form distinction alone; New York adopted 
alternative definitions of hashish (concentrated cannabis): separated resin or cannabis 
preparations which contain more than 2-\12 % THC by weight. 
38 N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 90-95 as amended by Act of 1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws; 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§§ 2925.01, 3719.0l(D)(Q), 3719.41 (Page Supp. 1976). 
39 ALASKA STAT.§§ 17.12.150(4), 17.12.110 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 152.01(9), 
152.09, 152.15 (West Supp. 1977). 
40 Telephone conversation with Dr. Robert Willette, National Institute on Drug Abuse 
(Oct. 15, 1976). 
41 See, e.g., VA .. CODE § 54.524.2(b)(l6) (Supp. 1977): 
" 'Hashish oil' means any oily extract containing one or more cannabinoids, but 
shall not include any such extract with a tetrahydrocannabinol content or less than 
twelve percent by weight." 
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activity which is primarily consumption- related. Casual, noncommercial 
transfers are commonplace in the experience of most marijuana users, 
partly because of the difficulty of obtaining the drug and partly because 
marijuana use, unlike the use of narcotics, is often a communal experi-
ence. The most frequent type of transfer is probably the gift of a small 
amount for immediate use, but other kinds of noncommercial transfers 
are also quite common. Collective purchases of up to one pound may be 
distributed among friends with each buyer paying his share of the aggre-
gate cost. In addition, students and other users with limited income 
sometimes sell small amounts at a slight profit in order to pay for their 
own use. 
Casual distribution of small amounts of marijuana is the functional 
equivalent of possession of small amounts of the drug. Recognizing this 
fact, Congress and eighteen states treat transfers of small amounts of 
marijuana without ~emuneration or without profit as misdemeanors rather 
than as felonious sales. 42 In 1972, the National Commission on Marijuana 
and Drug Abuse concluded, under the same rationale, that these casual 
transfers should be decriminalized if they occur in private. 43 
Undoubtedly, it is possible to distinguish these casual, distributive 
transactions, at least on a quantitative basis, from smuggling and other 
commercial activity involving large amounts of marijuana and large pro-
fits. If, for the same reasons that have prompted decriminalization of 
noncommercial possessory activity, legislators wish to draw a line at 
some point along the spectrum of distributive activity and to de-
criminalize below-the-line transfers, the primary decision to be made is 
how and where to draw the line. 
One criterion which may be used in classifying distributive activity is 
the nature of the transaction. A legislator attempting to decriminalize all 
consumption-related transfers might provide more lenient penalties when 
the transfer is a gift, when it does not result in profit to the transferor, or 
when the profit is less than a specified minimum. In terms of proof, it is 
most convenient to draw the line to exclude only gifts. Cost-only transfers 
arguably should not remain criminal, but efforts to distinguish nonprofit 
42 3 NATIONAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE, MARUUANA: A STUDY OF STATE POLICIES 
AND PENALITIES 87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
43 The Commission noted: 
With regard to the [decriminalization of] casual distribution of small amounts of 
marijuana for no remuneration or insignificant remuneration not involving a profit 
we are following the approach taken in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970 which in essence treats such casual transfers as the 
functional equivalent of possession. In doing so, Congress recognized that 
marijuana is generally shared among friends and that not all people who distribute 
marijuana are "pushers." 
The accuracy of Congress' appraisal is underscored by the National Survey. 
When people who had used marijuana were asked how they first obtained the drug, 
61 percent of the adults and 76 percent of the youth responded that it had been 
given to them. Only 4 percent of the adults and 8 percent of the youth said that they 
had bought it. When asked who their source had been, 67 percent of the adults and 
85 percent of the youth responded that it had been a friend, acquaintance, or family 
members. 
MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 157-58. 
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transactions from profitable ones will prove difficult, 44 and case-by-case 
adjudications of the profit issue hardly seem worth the effort when only 
small amounts are involved. 
The second relevant criterion for evaluation of distributive activity is 
the amount transferred. A statute which stipulates a designated amount 
could avoid the problems of proving co!'Ilmercial purpose by creating a 
statutory presumption similar to the presumptions suggested for posses-
sion offenses. Of course, it is conceivable that retail dealers may adjust 
their behavior to the contours of the law, never transferring more than the 
specified amount. However, as evidence emerges regarding the operation 
of such a provision and its impact on retail distribution patterns, the 
legislature can respond intelligently by simply increasing or decreasing 
the designated amount. 
Given the two available classification criteria, the nature of the transac-
tion and the quantity transferred, there are several possible policy 
choices. Decriminalization of gifts only is probably the minimum revision 
consistent with decriminalization of possession. It makes little sense to 
refuse to accord gifts, which are rarely dectected and rarely involve 
substantial amounts of marijuana_, the same penalty status as possession 
of small amounts; the donor is an accommodating user and different legal 
consequences seem fundamentally unfair. 
The decision to extend the scope of the decriminalized offense beyond 
gifts to include nonprofit sales, sales of small amounts, or both, requires a 
sensitive effort to accommodate the goals of decriminalization with con-
tinuing law enforcement needs under a prohibitory scheme. One cannot 
ignore the risk that decriminalization of any sales will create a loophole 
for professional retailers. By adjusting his trading patterns so as to make 
many small sales instead of a few large ones, a retailer might be able to 
continue a profitable commercial operation without risking any sanctions 
more severe than an occasional fine. Undoubtedly, a legislator whose 
primary goal is to decrease criminal justice costs by reducing prosecu-
tions of insignificant offenses will probably wish to limit decriminalization 
to gifts in order to avoid creating a loophole for retailers. On the other 
hand, maintaining criminal penalties for all sales will not be attractive to 
legislators who believe that the state's main objective in marijuana control 
is to contain the aggregate availability of the drug by deterring commercial 
activity. For such legislators, the aggregate market impact of distribution 
of small amounts will not be regarded as significant enough to warrant an 
overinclusive statutory provision which sweeps noncommercial dis-
tributors into the criminal justice system. 
Legislators who take the latter view must design legislation that covers 
•• The burden of proof is, of course, crucial in any effort to fix a statutory line between 
profit and non-profit transfers. If the burden is on the prosecution to prove that a sale 
resulted in a profit, conviction of commercial dealers becomes that much more difficult; on 
the other hand, if the burden is on the defendant to prove that the sale was not for profit, it 
becomes more difficult for accommodating users to reap the benefits of decriminalization. 
These problems might be ameliorated over time, of course, if evidence about current market 
conditions is systematically collected. 
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most consumer activity without opening a wide loophole for commercial 
activity. Sales are much more ambiguous than gifts: a sale of two ounces 
may be a simple accommodation between users, one purchasing part of 
another's supply at cost; or it may be part of a large-scale, profit-making 
retail enterprise. The legislator must simply aim to devise a realistic 
classification which· can be applied with reasonable convenience. One 
approach is to select a relatively low amount, one-half ounce or one 
ounce, for example, and impose a criminal penalty for all transfers of 
greater amounts. Another approach is to choose a higher amount and 
combine the profit and amount methods. For example, legislation could 
provide that sale of more than two ounces is not a criminal offense if the 
defendant proves that he made no profit. 
Whether or not amount is the conclusive statutory element, the precise 
figure which the legislature chooses is obviously of major importance. As 
noted above, the loophole risk is increased by raising the amount, while 
designation of an ·unnecessarily small amount will extend the criminal 
sanction to too many users. Resolution of this dilemma depends, in part, 
on an assessment of the practical significance of the loophole effect. 
Decriminalization of sales of small amounts may in fact induce retailers to 
adjust distribution patterns to decrease the risk of apprehension, and it 
may also induce enterprising consumers to enter the marijuana trade at 
the retail level. Neither of these effects will be significant, however, 
unless the criminal penalties already in force, as well as those in effect 
after decriminalization, have a significant deterrent effect on persons 
inclined to engage in commercial activity. It is axiomatic that the deter-
rent effect of criminal sanctions depends to a large extent on the level of 
enforcement. 45 Thus, if the enforcement of laws against commercial sale 
is relatively passive, the loophole effect of an accommodation provision 
will be minor, and a designated amount which is too low may simply 
increase the risk of discriminatory enforcement without making any sig-
nificant contribution to the deterrent process. On the other hand, if 
enforcement is active and the threat of detection is credible, enforcement 
objectives may well be compromised by an accommodation provision 
which permits careful retailers to escape punishment. 
In summary, the wisdom and technique of decriminalizing accommoda-
tion sales depend mainly on the importance that lawmakers attach to 
prosecution of retailers who profit from the sale of small amounts. A 
designated amount of two ounces is not likely to affect dealers who 
customarily transfer amounts over five pounds, because it will be too 
inconvenient to divide up a transaction of that magnitude into enough 
separate transfers to qualify as decriminalized activity. If legislators be-
lieve that enforcement efforts should be concentrated on major sources of 
supply, a possible loophole for small-scale retailers is a matter of little 
45 See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CONTROL 158-72 (1973). 
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concern, and the distribution of amounts up to two ounces probably 
should be decriminalized. 46 
On the other hand, legislators who believe that vigorous enforcement at 
the retail level has a significant impact on the supply of marijuana will 
want to limit the scope of decriminalization to such small amounts or to 
gifts only. It should be emphasized, however, that legislators who take 
the latter view probably will still distinguish among commercial marijuana 
offenses for penalty purposes. Depending on the relative importance 
attached to proportionality as a limiting principle in the application of 
criminal sanctions to commercial activity' legislators will want to sub-
divide the criminal offense of sale into categories that reflect the relative 
seriousness of the offense. Thus, transfers too serious to qualify for 
decriminalization may merit petty offense or misdemeanor penalties 
rather than felony classification. 
C. Cultivation for Personal Use 
The overwhelming majority of marijuana consumed in the United 
States is imported from Mexico, the Caribbean, or Central and South 
America. Although visitors to these countries may smuggle small 
amounts for their own use, most illicit importation is commercial in nature 
and involves s1,1bstantial amounts. Domestic cultivation of marijuana has 
never been a serious problem because its THC content is relatively low, 
but the plant is easily cultivated, can even be grown indoors, and is easily 
prepared for use. For this reason, small scale cultivation of marijuana is a 
relatively widespread practice in the United States. 
Under most current statutes, cultivation of any amount is punishable as 
a serious felony, with penalties usually as severe as those for sale. 47 It 
seems clear that legislators interested in reforming their marijuana penalty 
statute should, at a minimum, revise cultivation penalties in order to 
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial activity. Assuming 
that cultivation of small amounts for personal use should be subjected to 
lesser sanctions than commercial cultivation, two problems remain: 
whether the reduced offense of cultivation for personal use merits a 
criminal penalty and what specific amount constitutes commercial culti-
vation. 
A legislator interested only in conserving criminal justice resources 
while maximizing the deterrent value of the law probably will not be 
interested in decriminalizing cultivation. Few arrests are made for this 
activity and decriminalization of possession is not likely to increase 
cultivation arrests. On the other hand, a legislator aiming to remove 
46 This view was taken by Senators Javits and Hughes who, as members of the National 
Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, unsuccessfully urged the Commission to 
recommend withdrawal of the criminal sanction from all nonprofit transfers. Instead, the 
Commission limited its decriminalization recommendation to the "distribution of small 
amounts for insignificant remuneration." MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, 
at 154-56. 
47 See, e.g., 3 GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 89, 235 (1977). 
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disproportiori'ate criminal penalties from private, consumption-related 
behavior could decide to decriminalize cultivation for personal use be-
cause it is the functional equivalent of private use. Moreover, prohibitions 
against home cultivation are especially susceptible to arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement, and prosecution and punishment of the few 
who are detected usually arouses the same sense of unfairness which has 
provoked the decriminalization of possession. 
It might be argued, however, that decriminalization of home cultivation 
will permit an increase in the availability of marijuana and in frequency of 
consumption by users. Under this view, there is a difference in kind as 
well as degree between decriminalization of possessory conduct and 
decriminalization of cultivation: decriminalization of possessory conduct 
makes it possible for marijuana users to keep a limited supply on hand 
without risking serious penalties, but decriminalization of cultivation will 
increase the number of users who maintain a potentially unlimited source 
of supply. 48 
One answer to this contention may be that the ultimate social goal of 
marijuana prohibition, reducing the adverse social consequences of 
marijuana use, is better served by a sanctioning system which covertly 
encourages rather than deters home consumption by users. Most home-
grown marijuana will be less potent than imported marijuana and presum-
ably will result in fewer adverse health consequences, both acute and 
chronic. Also, since users who grow their own marijuana will not be 
supporting the commercial market, decriminalizing personal cultivation 
might reduce the aggregate demand for smuggled contraband, reducing 
the price and ultimately reducing the supply. Finally, users who choose to 
grow their own marijuana are no longer in constant contact with dealers 
who may sell more dangerous drugs. 
However the decriminalization issue is resolved, legislators should 
attempt to grade the penalties for cultivation, reducing to a misdemeanor 
the penalty for noncommercial cultivation of small amounts. Whether 
decriminalized or reduced to a misdemeanor, the question arises how this 
personal cultivation offense should be distinguished from commercial 
activity. Because much of the marijuana plant cannot be consumed, it is 
probably advisable to use a figure based on the number of plants rather 
than on the weight of the cannabis, and to designate a number that will 
yield approximately the amount of usable marijuana which defines the 
line between criminal and noncriminal possessory offenses. Alterna-
tively, policy makers may wish to set a smaller amount which reflects the 
importance they attach to discouragement of cultivation, or a larger 
amount which reflects the fact that a single planting is often intended to 
yield a year's supply of marijuana. 
48 If cultivation for personal use is decriminalized, it will be theoretically possible for 
every user to grow and consume, in relative safety, as much marijuana as he pleases. Even 
the risk of incurring a fine or having the plants confiscated would not be very great, as long 
as the cultivation was carried out on private property, out of public view. 
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II. SELECTING SANCTIONS FOR MARUUANA UsE'Rs: 
THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The trend toward marijuana decriminalization must be viewed in the 
context of generic efforts to redefine the scope of the criminal law. For 
almost two decades, criminal law scholars and increasing numbers of 
politicians have called attention to the adverse institutional effects of 
overcriminalization and have repeatedly urged the repeal of criminal 
sanctions for consensual sexual behavior, gambling, public drunkenness 
and, more recently, illicit drug use. 49 The explosion of drug use in gen-
eral, and marijuana use in particular, in the 1960's became a major 
political issue and triggered a sometimes volatile debate over the wisdom 
and legitimacy of drug laws. 50 Jail terms for middle class marijuana users 
sparked controversy, and critics of marijuana laws suddenly had a public 
audience for the libertarian and social cost arguments against over-
criminalization which had been so thoroughly discussed in the scholarly 
literature during the preceding decade. 
When the National Commission recommended decriminalization in 
1972, it tried to avoid the political polemics which ensnared marijuana use 
in wider social conflicts concerning countercultural politics and war pro-
test. Instead, the Commission placed its recommendation squarely in the 
context of the widely acknowledged need to reallocate law enforcement 
resources, to restore and preserve the institutional integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system, and to strike an appropriate balance between protec-
tion of legitimate public interests and the value of personal liberty. 51 
Similarly, the American Bar Association, 52 the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,53 the National Advisory Com-
mission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,54 and other expert 
bodies concerned with the administration of criminal justice have tied 
their endorsements of marijuana decriminalization to the general need for 
criminal law reform rather than to the more contentious arguments con-
cerning the rights of drug users. 
The theoretical context of marijuana law reform accounts for the in-
cremental nature of the legislative efforts. Since the focus has been on the 
institutional inappropriateness of criminal punishment, rather than on the 
rights of marijuana users to use the drug, legislators have generally sought 
to modify the nature and consequences of the prescribed punishment 
rather than to immunize the decriminalized behavior from legal control. 
Whereas the National Commission saw no need to treat consumption-
49 See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); Kadish, The 
Crisis of Overcrimina/ization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967); Junker, Criminalization and 
Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 697 (1972). 
so See generally R. BONNIE & c. WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 222-93. 
51 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 138-46. 
52 See R. Bonnie & C. Whitebread, supra note 4, at 286-89. 
53 /d. at 288-89. 
54 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A 
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 201-04 (1973). 
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related behayior as a punishable offense, most reform-minded politicians 
have been unwilling to go this far; instead, every statutory implementa-
tion of the Commission's recommendation has aimed to achieve the 
benefits of decriminalization without depenalizing the behavior. While 
many legislators seem to agree that traditional criminal penalties, espe-
cially incarceration, 55 are too severe for marijuana users, a consensus 
seems to have emerged that their conduct must nonetheless remain 
punishable to effectuate society's interest in discouraging use. 56 For this 
reason, the marijuana reform movement must be viewed as the first 
systematic effort to implement another generic penal code reform: the 
formulation of noncriminal or civil sanctions for disapproved behavior 
which is not considered serious enough to warrant traditional criminal 
sanctions. 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code argued that the criminal sanction 
is too potent, too stigmatizing, and too cumbersome from a procedural 
standpoint for much disapproved behavior, especially violations of reg-
ulatory provisions and local ordinances which are not regarded as morally 
offensive and many of which require no mens rea. 57 To deal with such 
conduct, the Code drafters recommended that legislatures create a civil 
violation, punishable solely by a fine with a maximum amount of $500 and 
resulting in none of the adverse legal consequences attendant upon con-
viction of a criminal offense. 58 Several years later, the 1970 Report of the 
National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws discussed 
an infraction offense modeled after the Model Penal Code civil viola-
tion. 59 Similarly, in 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, with a mandate to formulate national stand-
ards for crime reduction and prevention at the state and local level, urged 
55 Incarceration is rarely imposed on marijuana users under existing misdemeanor sta-
tutes. Even those legislators who oppose decriminalization frequently record their opposi-
tion to imprisonment of first offenders. This widely shared view may be based on a belief 
that the incremental deterrent value of a threat of incarceration is outweighed by the 
individual injustices and the procedural inefficiencies that are introduced into the system by 
authorizing imprisonment for the least serious marijuana behavior, however this is defined. 
In addition, many legislators may also have concluded that incarceration is a disproportion-
ately severe sanction for the least serious marijuana offenses. For a statement which 
endorses repeal of incarceration but deals evasively with decriminalization, see NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 54, at 
202-03. 
56 This reasoning was stated by Senator Birch Bayh during a colloquy with the author in 
May 1975; Marijuana Decriminalization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate 
Juvenile Delinquency of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess., 109-12, 155-56 
(1975). 
57 See Commentary to§ 1.05 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE 8-9 (Tentative Draft# 2 1954). 
58 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State constitutes a 
violation if it is so designated in this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no 
other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized 
upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code which now 
provides that the offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not consti-
tute a crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal 
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense. 
59 II NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING 
PAPERS 1302-03 (1970). 
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the creation of a separate administrative structure for processing minor 
traffic violations, violations of building codes, zoning ordinances, health 
and safety regulations, and evasions of state taxes. 60 
If the Model Penal Code civil offense concept had been widely adopted, 
it is conceivable that marijuana decriminalization proposals might have 
focused on the relatively simple question of whether the offense should be 
reclassified from a misdemeanor to a civil violation, and the legislation 
itself might have been limited to a simple cross-reference to the preexist-
ing offense classification section of the code. However, most states have 
not adopted the civil offense concept and those that have done so have 
usually limited its application to traffic offenses which are not popularly 
regarded as crimes even when formally classified as misdemeanors. 61 For 
this reason, the effort to decriminalize marijuana use has occasioned a 
confusing array of proposals and statutes which differ significantly from 
state to state. For the most part, the statutes which purportedly de-
criminalize marijuana have only one thing in common: they preclude 
incarceration as the penalty for a first offender. 
Marijuana decriminalization statutes convincingly demonstrate the de-
scriptive inadequacy of the traditional distinction between civil and crim-
inal penalties. Certainly the mere use of one label or the other has no 
operational significance, for even if legislators have concluded that tradi-
tional criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, are not appropriate for 
least serious marijuana offenses, the sanctions imposed for violating the 
law may be modified without changing the statutory label. For example, a 
criminal offense may be punishable by a fine only. 62 Even if an offense is 
punishable by imprisonment after conviction, systematic use of a precon-
viction diversion program may undermine the original classification as a 
60 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 177-78 (1973). 
61 Only a few states have codified the violation concept in its entirety, setting a fine as the 
maximum punishment and expressly stating that offenses so classified are not crimes and 
that customary disabilities do not attach. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-24 
(1971); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 775.08 (Supp. 1974); KY. REV. STAT.§ 500.080(17) (1975); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 609.02(4)(a) (West Supp. 1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 625.9 (Supp. 1973); OR. 
REV. STAT.§ 161.565 (Supp. 1973). 
Several states classify some conduct as offenses, labeled petty misdemeanors, for exam-
ple, which are punishable by fine only and usually citable, but which are still crimes. See, 
e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16, 19(c) (Supp. 1968) (infraction); I CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
18-1-104, 18-1-107 (1973) (Class 2 petty offense); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§4203, 4207(d) (1975) 
(violation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-1-15, 1005-1-17 (Smith-Hurd 1973) (petty 
offense) N. M. STAT. ANN.§ 40-A-1-6 (1953) (petty misdemeanor); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2901.02(6) (Page 1975) (minor misdemeanor); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 106(c) (Purdon 
1973) (summary offense); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 76-3-105, 76-3-205 (Supp. 1973) (infraction). 
Pennsylvania law is unclear whether the summary offense, which may entail up to ninety 
days in jail, is a crime. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 106(a) does not list a summary offense as 
one of the classes of crime, but the same section also provides that any offense for which a 
defendant may be jailed is a crime. To date the issue is unlitigated. 
New York has adopted modified versions of the civil offense concept recommended in the 
Model Penal Code. New York's violation is not a crime but is nonetheless punishable by a 
sentence of imprisonment up to 15 days. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 10.00(6) (McKinney 1967). 
62 See. e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 16, 19(c) (Supp. 1968); CoLO. REV. STAT.§§ 18-1-104 
(1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II,§§ 4203, 4207(d) (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 
1005-1-15, 1005-1-17 (Smith-Hurd 1973); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2901.02(G) (Page 1975). 
22 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 11 :3 
crime. 63 Finally, specific provisions mandating the use of citations 
minimize the likelihood of deprivation of liberty after arrest, and the 
consequences of convictions may be ameliorated through other specific 
provisions permitting record expungement or a statement of no record on 
job applications. 64 
Even when an offense is classified as a civil violation for purposes of 
record consequences, the legislature might provide that the offense is still 
punishable by confinement. For example, the current version of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's bill revising the federal criminal law creates 
a noncriminal category of civil infractions but permits the judge to sen-
tence a violator to up to five days in jail. 65 
63 The drug laws of at least 30 states now include provisions for some type of discretionary 
conditional discharge or preconviction diversion. Typically the judge or prosecutor is 
formally authorized to hold charges in abeyance pending the defendant's satisfactory per-
formance of specified conditions. Upon passage of the statutory period, the judge may 
dismiss the charges without conviction. One state, West Virginia, has made conditional 
discharge mandatory for any first offender charged with possession or distribution of less 
than 15 grams of marijuana. See generally 3 GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 
42, at 91-92, 109-10. On diversion generally, see R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION (1974). 
64 See generally 3 GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 105-11. 
65 The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2301(b)(9) 
(1977). Similarly, New York classifies some offenses as violations which are not crimes but 
which are punishable by up to 15 days in jail. See, e.g., vehicle offenses and violations of 
construction regulations in New York. See note 61 supra. 
The history of the infraction provision of S. 1437 is instructive. The 1970 Report of the 
Brown Commission, the NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970), included an offense 
called an infraction which is not a crime, id. § 109(h), and which is not punishable by 
imprisonment, id. § 109(n). Instead, the penalty is a fine ofup to $500, id.§ 330l(l)(d), or one 
year's probation, id. § 3102(1)(c). The Brown Commission concluded that the infraction 
would be particularly appropriate in the area of strict liability regulatory offenses, id. § 1006, 
but also applied this concept to first-time marijuana possession, id. § 1824(1), and to 
disobeying a public safety order, id. § 1804. 
S. I, the 1973 version of the federal criminal code, utilized the basic principle of the 
noncriminal offense but with an important difference. The S. I drafters provided for the first 
time that the infraction, now termed a violation, could be punished by a period of confine-
ment, in this case up to 30 days. S. I, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., §l-4Bl(c)(3) (1973). This 
proposal also increased the possible fine to $50 per day, id. § l-4C l(a)(4), and reclassified the 
possession of marijuana as a misdemeanor, id. § 2-9E l(b)(6). 
In 1974 S. 1400 replaced S. I, and the concept was again revised. The sentence for an 
infraction was reduced to a $500 fine and a maximum of five days in jail. S. 1400, 93rd Cong., 
1st Sess., §§ 2201(b)(9), 2002(a)(l)(D) (1974). This sanction was extended to apply to 
disorderly conduct, an offense which had not been included in the earlier drafts. Id. § 1871. 
The regulatory offense was abolished, however, removing the original rationale underlying 
the creation of the infraction. 
The 1975 version of the Code retained the maximum five day jail sentence but increased 
the fine to a maximum of $10,000. S. 1437, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S. I, §§ 2301(b)(9), 
220l(b)(2)(C) (1975). S. 1437, the Judiciary Committee's bill pending before the Senate, also 
contains the infraction in this form. 
S. Rep. No. 90-00 at p. 918 provides one of the only references to this provision in the 
legislative history. The report acknowledges that the infraction punishable by imprisonment 
is a departure from the Brown Commission Report. The inclusion of a jail term is justified on 
the grounds that a short term of confinement will promote the deterrence and rehabilitation 
of the offender. Further, the drafters realized that, due to the holding in Tate v. Short, 401 
U.S. 395 (1971), a fine is an ineffective sanction when applied to indigents. Tate v. Short 
held that an offender may not be imprisoned because of an involuntary inability to pay a fine. 
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In short, there is at present no clear division between criminal and civil 
sanctions; instead, legislators have at their disposal a continuum of sanc-
tions of varied severity. Approaching the matter functionally, it is helpful 
to recognize that the sanctioning process begins after apprehension for 
the offense and that some sanctions take effect even before adjudication. 
For example, postarrest consequences may include injury to reputation 
arising from disclosure of information or records about the fact or cir-
cumstances of apprehension; deprivation of physical liberty occurring 
when a person is taken into custody or is required to appear in court; and 
deprivation of wealth occurring because a person must sustain the ex-
penses of defending himself and may miss time on the job. Similarly, 
postconviction consequences may include injury to reputation arising 
from disclosure of information or records about the fact or circumstances 
of conviction; deprivation of physical liberty occasioned by sentences to 
continuous or periodic confinement or even by probation, community 
service orders and other community-based alternatives to confinement;66 
and deprivation occasioned by the payment of fines and lost economic 
opportunities. 
The choice of a particular sanctioning device implicates constitutional 
procedural requirements which do not necessarily parallel the use of 
criminal or civil labels. For example, a jail term may not be imposed, even 
for a day, unless indigent defendants have been represented by counsel.67 
On the other hand, no jury trial is required unless the defendant can be 
sentenced to more than six months in jail. 68 The confusion surrounding 
sanctions is reflected in the uncertainty over whether the applicable 
standard of proof must be the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt or a civil standard of clear and convincing evidence or a preponder-
ance of the evidence.69 
III. MODIFYING THE CRIMINAL SANCTION: 
POSTCONVICTION CONSEQUENCES 
If imprisonment is regarded as an unjust or inefficient sanction for 
consumption-related conduct, many important issues must be resolved 
The current version of the infraction proposal is also supported by the Committee on 
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws of the American Bar Association. The ABA Commit-
tee endorsed the provision on the same grounds stated in the Senate Report and further 
suggested that it could be usefully applied to cases of parole violation. 
86 On noncustodial or semicustodial penalties, see generally BRITISH HOME OFFICE, 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM: NON-CUSTODIAL AND SEMI-
CUSTODIAL PENALTIES (1970); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, 150-54, 569-71 (1973). 
67 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
68 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
69 See Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 22 CRIM. L. REP. 2220 (BNA) (Ore. 
Dec. 7, 1977). See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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regarding the legal consequences of being found guilty of such conduct. 
The primary problem is to determine what, if any, legal sanctions are 
appropriate for consumption-related behavior. If the sanction includes a 
fine, the amount of the fine and the consequences of nonpayment must be 
determined. Legislators must also decide if the violation should be 
punishable by the imposition of a criminal record and if the ordinary 
consequences of such a record should be ameliorated for consumption-
related conduct. Finally, the possibility of increasing the sanction for 
subsequent offenses and making special provision for minor offenders 
must also be considered. 
A. Are Legal Sanctions Against Use Necessary? 
Two of the traditional purposes of penal provisions, incapacitation of 
dangerous offenders and punishment of intrinsically immoral behavior, 
are wholly inapplicable to consumption-related marijuana offenses. In-
stead, the possible utility of a sanction for this conduct lies in its im-
plementation of a policy aimed at discouraging marijuana consumption. In 
theory, there are three ways that legal coercion, short of a threat of 
imprisonment, can accomplish this purpose: by deterring the prohibited 
behavior; by providing legal leverage to channel detected users into 
specific programs designed to discourage consumption; and by symboliz-
ing social disapproval of the behavior, thereby reinforcing attitudes un-
favorable to consumption. 
Individual decisions to experiment with marijuana have not been sig-
nificantly influenced in recent years by the fear of legal sanctions, 70 and, 
as a practical matter, the incremental deterrent effect of a fine is probably 
not substantial. Instead, it is the prohibition against distribution which 
circumscribes the population with an opportunity to experiment by forc-
ing the traffic underground, making the drug inconvenient to obtain. 
Similarly, these prohibitions against distribution, by establishing the con-
ditions of availability, play a much more significant role in containing the 
population of continuing users, which includes less than fifty percent of 
the experimenters, than does the threat of sanctions for possession. A fine 
applied with certainty would, at most, decrease the rate of increase in 
experimentation. Although there are no data measuring the increase in the 
rate of experimentation when sanctions are removed altogether, the data 
in states which have enacted fines in lieu of jail terms are wholly consis-
70 Despite felony possession penalties, it was estimated that some 20 million Americans 
had tried marijuana by 1969. See R. BONNIE & C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 237-38 
(1973). The National Commission's survey indicated that 24 million had tried the drug by 
1971, when possession was a misdemeanor in most states. MARIHUANA COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 32-33. The current figure is estimated to be at least 36 million who 
have used marijuana at least once. SECRETARY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, 
MARIHUANA AND HEALTH: SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 4-5 
(1976), although a recent statement by President Carter quoted a figure of 45 million, White 
House Press Release (Aug. 2, 1977). 
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tent with this analysis. 71 Since the opportunity to consume occurs mainly 
in private, continuing sanctions against possession will serve, at most, to 
discourage regular users from transporting marijuana on their person or in 
their vehicles when in public. 
While legal sanctions may be of significant value in providing the 
leverage to channel alcoholics and heroin addicts into treatment pro-
grams, they appear to be of minimal value where marijuana users are 
concerned. The overwhelming majority of persons who experiment with 
marijuana and use it recreationally are not in need of treatment; they are 
indistinguishable from their non-marijuana-using peers by any criterion 
other than their marijuana use. 72 Instead, the main value of leverage is 
educational and preventive rather than therapeutic. It must be ques-
tioned, however, whether the costs of enforcing such a sanction and 
maintaining an educational program are worth the probable benefits. 
Persons who have been apprehended for marijuana possession will prob-
ably not be told anything that they do not already know. If the objective is 
simply to counsel against the use of more harmful substances, the imposi-
tion of legal sanctions seems to be a costly and unnecessarily coercive 
71 In its study of the impact of decriminalization in 1976, the National Governors' Confer-
ence compiled information on use patterns in California and Oregon. See generally 2 
GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 32-38. The most reliable source of 
information about use patterns is a series of surveys sponsored by the Drug Abuse Council, 
Inc. in Oregon in 1974, 1975, and 1976. These studies show the patterns of marijuana use 
remain relatively stable, both in absolute terms and compared with national trends, despite 
the enactment of noncriminal penalties for possession. Although the long term effects of 
such penalty reductions are unclear, the recent statutory revisions have not resulted in 
significant increases either in the number of ever users, the number of current users, or the 
amount which they use. 
The apparent short term stability of use implies, first, that the sporadically enforced 
misdemeanor criminal penalties for possession which are now in force in most states are not 
a major factor in personal decisions whether to initiate or continue marijuana use in teenage 
and young adult years. Second, these findings demonstrate that decriminalization is consis-
tent with, and will not undermine, a discouragement policy. Changing the law does not 
connote approval of use and is not perceived by either users or the nonusing public as an 
endorsement of marijuana. Third, decriminalization does not open the floodgates to signifi-
cantly increased experimentation. In Oregon, for example, 76% of the adults questioned still 
had not tried the drug three years after the law went into effect. The overall incidence of 
experimentation does not exceed the national average; indeed, it is surprising that more 
nonusers were not interested in tasting the long-forbidden fruit after criminal penalties were 
withdrawn. 
Perhaps the most crucial finding is that the proportion of recreational users and the 
prevalence of heavy users are substantially the same in decriminalized and nonde-
criminali_zed jurisdictions. In other words, the patterns of use (the frequency of use and 
amount consumed) remained stable. In Oregon, for example, one-half of the users indicated 
in 1976 that they had not changed the frequ·ency with which they used the drug since 
decriminalization had been adopted; another 39% indicated that they had reduced their 
consumption; only 9% said they had increased it. Since the discouragement policy is rooted 
primarily in concerns about the psychological and physiological consequences of heavy use, 
these findings are extremely important. 
72 In 1972, the National Commission warned against the tendency to characterize 
marijuana users as sick and therefore in need of treatment rather than deserving of punish-
ment. MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 90-91. The warning apparently 
went unheeded. A Presidential Task Force found in 1975 that casual marijuana users were 
being inappropriately referred to drug treatment centers by judges and prosecutors looking 
for an alternative to the criminal justice system. DOMESTIC COUNCIL DRUG ABUSE TASK 
FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON DRUG ABUSE: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 70 (1975). 
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method of reaching this result. Indeed, it seems unwise to pervert the 
criminal justice system to serve functions which ought to be performed by 
the public school system. If children and adolescents apprehended for 
marijuana possession need to be channeled formally into appropriate 
counseling or education program.s, the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice 
system is sufficient for this purpose. In sum, leverage is an inadequate 
justification, by itself, for imposing legal sanctions on consumption-
related activity by all marijuana offenders, including responsible adults. 
The most convincing argument for retaining some legal sanction for 
consumption-related behavior is its presumed symbolic effect. It can be 
argued that the educative or moralizing influence generated by a formal 
expression of social disapproval reinforces other sociocultural forces 
which shape desired attitudes toward consumption of psychoactive drugs 
in general and marijuana in particular. 73 Fom a purely empirical 
standpoint, the pertinent question is whether the penalty for consumption 
significantly augm_ents the symbolic message conveyed by the total pro-
hibition against cultivation, importation and distribution; or, whether the 
absence of a sanction connotes approval of marijuana possession despite 
enforcement of prohibitions against availability. The data compiled in 
Oregon and other reform jurisdictions strongly support the hypothesis 
that decriminalization does not, in itself, encourage use, although the 
penalty reduction does seem to convey and reinforce the message that use 
of marijuana is not as harmful as it was formerly thought to be. 74 
73 See generally J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 3-33 (1974). 
74 Although the incidence and patterns of use remained virtually unchanged in Oregon for 
the two years immediately following decriminalization, the 1976 data did show a large 
increase relative to the two previous years: the proportion of ever users among adults rose 
from 20 to 24% and the proportion of current users rose from 9 to 12%. Although both 
figures are now slightly above the national average, they are not higher than the regional 
averages for the Western states. One is led to ask, however, why the acceleration in 
experimentation and recreational use has occurred. Although the acceleration may suggest 
that the criminal prohibition was containing use and that these patterns will now continue, 
the most plausible hypothesis is that the incidence of experimental and recreational use in 
Oregon and elsewhere has been largely restrained by exaggerated perceptions of the harm-
fulness of marijuana. More realistic asses~ments of the effects of use contributed to an 
increase in use in the late 1960's and early 1970's, followed by a levelling off in use 
nationwide. The Oregon data suggests that the change in the law, combined with national 
publicity, symbolized and communicated the message that marijuana is not as harmful as it 
was thought to be. Thus, deterrence in the classic sense is not operating here: the reduced 
penalty did not quickly lead to increased experimentation among those who previously had 
been interested but were fearful of arrest and punishment. Instead, the educative and 
declaratory functions of the law may be involved in this trend. That is, when it became 
apparent to large segments of the population that marijuana use was not very dangerous, use 
increased despite the law, and the legislature responded by changing the law, thus .reflecting 
and symbolizing these changing attitudes. Because the law is intertwined with other 
sociocultural factors which shape attitudes of potential users, it is conceivable that one long 
term effect of decriminalization is to reinforce tht public's increasingly accurate perceptions 
about the effects of use. 
This interpretation, that the increase in use is responsive to assessments of the effects of 
marijuana use rather than to a change in the law is supported by two key findings. First, the 
number of persons reporting fear of adverse health effects as a reason for not using 
marijuana declined dramatically between the 1974 (23%) and 1976 (7%) surveys. Second, the 
increase in use among Oregonians is concentrated among teenagers and young adults; yet 
this change could have been predicted on the basis of national and regional trends. The data 
have indicated since 1972 that a majority of the 16-25 age group have experienced marijuana 
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The utility of legal sanctions for marijuana consumption depends on 
whether the incremental deterrent and symbolic effects of the legal sanc-
tion in decreasing the number of users and the frequency of use warrant 
the resulting administrative costs and invasions of personal privacy. Ten 
members of the National Commission did not think so, although three 
members endorsed the civil fine primarily for symbolic reasons. 75 Legis-
lators have neglected to address the question and have apparently as-
sumed that some sanction is better than none at all. Even from a purely 
fiscal point of view, this assumption may be unjustified, since the ad-
ministrative costs of enforcing the law and processing violations probably 
substantially exceed the amount collected in most jurisdictions. The costs 
of criminal justice processing can be reduced substantially, however, by 
foregoing the customary incidents of the criminal process such as book-
ing, custody, and personal appearance in court. 76 Also, as the experience 
with the California fine statute has shown, a large number of detected and 
sanctioned violations can produce a sizable amount in fines. 77 
In summary, these observations suggest that a legislator who believes 
that some legal penalty for marijuana consumption is necessary to dis-
courage marijuana use should select a fine, not a leverage sanction, and 
should facilitate its efficient and minimally intrusive administration. On 
the other hand, a lawmaker who believes that the incremental symbolic 
and deterrent benefits of a consumption penalty do not significantly 
exceed the preventive effects of continuing prohibitions against distribu-
tion, or who believes that any penalty for possession is disproportionate 
to the harm engendered by the conduct, should withdraw all legal sanc-
tions from least serious consumption-related behavior, as the National 
Commission recommended. 
Even if the legislature concludes that least serious marijuana offenses 
should remain punishable by some sanction, it should consider limiting 
the application of the prescribed penalties to violations which occur in 
public places, including moving vehicles. A clear statutory distinction 
between public and private behavior would tend to channel marijuana use 
into private locations, thereby reducing the likelihood of intoxicated 
driving and incapacitated behavior in public. The main reason for exclud-
ing possession in a private location from the sanctioning provision, how-
ever, is that the threat of intrusions into the home is of limited deterrent 
value under any foreseeable enforcement circumstances. The overwhelm-
ing proportion of marijuana arrests under current criminal statutes occur 
as a result of police patrol activities, either on the street or in connection 
with vehicle searches. 78 Further, the detection of marijuana consumption 
in the home should have a low priority for police investigative resources, 
and explicit decriminalization of private possession will both establish a 
use, and e-,er-use among this group has long been over 60% in the West. 
75 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 152-53. 
76 See text at notes 116-31 infra. 
77 NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE STATE OFFICE, A FIRST REPORT OF THE IMPACT OF 
CALIFORNIA'S NEW MARUUANA LAW (5895) (1977). 
78 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at App. Vol. II, 634. 
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clear legislative directive on this point and eliminate the risk of harass-
ment and discriminatory enforcement associated with searches of private 
locations. 
Retention of civil penalties for private possession will not eliminate 
these problems; if private possession of less than the statutory amount 
remains a noncriminal offense, users will still be subject to apprehension 
in the home. 79 Moreover, possession of a small amount might be used as a 
pretext for searching the home for larger amounts, or even for arrest on 
suspicion of possessing larger amounts. In order to prevent these intru-
sions, which occur too sporadically to represent a credible deterrent, 
private possession of less than the designated amount could be excluded 
from the definition of noncriminal as well as criminal marijuana of-
fenses. 80 
No state has yet depenalized private possessory conduct, but Alaska 
has taken an important step in this direction. Public possession of more 
than one ounce is· a misdemeanor, as is public use of the drug, whereas 
public possession of one ounce or less is punishable as a civil offense. In 
contrast to the amount approach used for public behavior, however, 
private conduct is graded by the pure intent approach: private use or 
private possession of any amount is a civil offense unless there is proof of 
intent to sell. 81 
B. The Record Consequences of Arrest and Conviction: 
Is Stigma Necessary? 
If the legislature decides to impose a fine for least serious marijuana-
related behavior, it must also decide to what extent, if at all, the commis-
sion of such an offense will subject the offender to the criminal process. A 
criminal arrest, even if no conviction follows, will normally be a traumatic 
experience, particularly for the first offender. Even if the arrestee is 
ultimately released without charge or is acquitted, he will suffer the 
inconvenience and embarassment of being brought to the police station, 
photographed, and fingerprinted. This deprivation of liberty could last a 
significant length of time, especially if bail is required and the defendant is 
unable to post it immediately. He also may miss work while being de-
tained, and, even if he loses no working time, his employer may dismiss 
him upon learning of the arrest. 
The existence of an arrest record can also detrimentally affect the 
arrestee in subsequent encounters with the criminal justice system: he is 
less likely than a person without a record to receive lenient treatment 
79 Of course, the legislature might limit the grounds for issuance of warrants, thus vitiating 
the decision to make the offense punishable. See text at notes 124-25 infra. 
80 Alternatively, the designated amount for private possession could be increased or 
replaced by a requirement that the state prove intent to sell whenever the drug was seized in 
a private location. 
81 ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.1 IO(d) (1975). The Alaska Supreme Court contributed to this 
statutory response by holding unconstitutional the imposition of a criminal penalty for 
possession for personal use in the home. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). 
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from the prosecutor in the form of dropped or reduced charges, and an 
arrestee with a record may receive a harsher sentence than a similarly 
situated first offender.82 An arrest record may also limit the arrestee's 
employment opportunities, especially if this information is accessible to 
potential employers. Even if the information is not disseminated, the 
arrestee may be prejudiced by being asked whether he has ever been 
arrested or convicted of a crime, a common question on most applica-
tions. 83 
If the arrestee is subsequently convicted of a criminal offense, all of 
these record consequences are exacerbated by the numerous legal dis-
abilities flowing from the criminal conviction, even for a misdemeanor. 
The records may be accessible to both public and private employers. The 
convicted misdemeanant may be precluded by licensing laws from engag-
ing in certain occupations and from securing public employment. A con-
victed felon in virtually all states is ineligible for occupational licenses and 
public employment and is usually disenfranchised as well. 84 
A number of state legislatures have enacted generic provisions for 
reducing these consequences of criminal arrest and conviction records, 85 
and federal regulations now govern the dissemination of arrest records. 86 
Thus far, however, the piecemeal nature of the effort to modify criminal 
sanctions for marijuana use has required legislators to focus on these 
questions for this offense alone rather than as part of a general reconsid-
eration of the effect of criminal records. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider 
alternative methods for ameliorating the record consequences of arrest 
and conviction as part of a reduction or elimination of criminal penalties 
for consumption-related marijuana behavior. Of course, the extent to 
which record consequences are ameliorated may differ according to the 
rationale for changing the sanctions applied to the use of marijuana. 
There is reason to believe that favorable legislative sentiment for de-
criminalization is largely attributable to a widely shared view that the 
stigma associated with traditional criminal processes is a disproportion-
ately severe punishment for such a minor, widely committed, offense. 
Reform-minded legislators and their constituents as well87 apparently 
82 See Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 553 P.2d 624 (1976); 
Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972). 
83 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND 
GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1973); PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1%7). 
84 See generally Tentative Draft of American Bar Association Standards on the Legal 
Status of Prisoners, Part X Civil Disabilities, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 377 (1977). 
85 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRA-
TION, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS GOVERNING PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION (1975). 
86 28 C.F.R. Part 20, 41 Fed. Reg. No. 55 (1976). See generally ZIMMERMAN, et. al., How 
TO IMPLEMENT PRIVACY AND SECURITY (1976); Criminal Justice Information and Protec-
tion of Privacy Act of /975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., !st Sess., (1975). 
87 A Gallup poll released in May 1977 indicated that 53% of the nation's adults believed 
that possession of a small amount of marijuana should not be a criminal offense. 
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believe that possession of marijuana for personal use simply is not a 
sufficiently serious offense to warrant the imposition of all the legal, 
economic, and social disabilities ordinarily associated with the criminal 
sanction. Apart from this elementary notion of proportionality, a related 
rationale may be the unfairness to the individual and the counterproduc-
tive social effect of stigmatizing marijuana offenders with criminal labels. 
For either reason, a legislator may well believe that any type of criminal 
stigma associated with marijuana use engenders a disrespect for the 
criminal justice system as a whole. 
Legislators who adopt this view are not influenced by arguments that 
the criminal stigma generates deterrent and symbolic effects not as-
sociated with noncriminal processes and penalties. Even those legislators 
who are not categorically opposed to serious, even stigmatizing, sanc-
tions may nonetheless believe that the incremental preventive value of 
criminal processes and records is offset by the administrative costs of 
implementing them. A legislature might easily determine, for example, 
that the police resources now employed in booking, recording, and main-
taining the records of marijuana offenders could be better expended in the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against person or property. Simi-
larly, legislators might well find that the procedural system necessary to 
process criminal offenses is too costly, and they may be willing to sac-
rifice the stigmatizing effects of the sanction to facilitate expeditious and 
convenient processing of offenders. 
Whether for reasons of fairness or expediency, five of the ten reform 
jurisdictions have reclassified least-serious marijuana behavior as a civil 
offense and have eliminated all the record incidents of apprehension, 
adjudication, and other aspects of the criminal process. 88 Ohio has speci-
fically eliminated all of the record consequences of the criminal process 
but has nevertheless insisted on classifying the' offense as criminal. 89 A 
88 ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.llO(d) (1975) (offense punishable by a civil fine); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 22, § 2383 (Supp. 1978) (civil violation); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-2-9-139(d)(2) 
(Supp. 1977) (offense punishable by a civil fine); Marihuana Reform Act, ch. 360, § 221. 05, 
1977 N.Y. Laws 500 (violation); OR. REv. STAT. § 167.207(3) (1975) (violation). 
89 Under Ohio law, possession of less than 100 grams of marijuana is a minor mis-
demeanor, a criminal offense, but arrest or conviction for this offense does not produce a 
criminal record. A person arrested or convicted under this provision is expressly relieved of 
the obligation to report such a record in response to inquiries about his or her criminal 
record, including inquiries on employment or license applications. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 
2925.1 l(D) (Page Supp. 1976). 
The City Council of the District of Columbia recently approved a bill which continues to 
classify possession of one ounce or less of marijuana as a misdemeanor but which provides 
for mandatory citation for the first three offenses and stipulates that criminaljustice records, 
which must be maintained separately, are not criminal records. The Washington Post, Nov. 
9, 1977, at Cl. Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee's approved version of S. 1437, 
supra note 3, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, includes a marijuana provision which 
classifies possession of up to an ounce of marijuana as a criminal infraction, provides that 
possession of 10 grams or less is punishable by a maximum fine of $100, and that criminal 
records are automatically expunged after six months for the first two offenses. The 
Washington Star, Nov. 2, 1977, at A6. In a preliminary vote a week earlier a majority of the 
committee then present had voted to classify the offense of possession of up to one ounce as 
a civil infraction. The Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1977, at Al. An even earlier compromise 
provision would have depenalized possession of up to 10 grams while possession of more 
than IO grams would have remained a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail. Id. 
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more explicit statement of the presumed symbolic, moralizing effects of 
the mere labelling of disapproved behavior as a crime can hardly be 
imagined. 
In contrast, the legislatures in the remaining four states not only re-
tained the criminal classification of the offense but also retained some of 
the normal record consequences of the criminal process. Analysis of 
these statutes reveals no consistent pattern: arrest records are created in 
some but not in others; adjudications of guilt constitute convictions in 
some but not in others; and arrest and conviction records are automati-
cally expunged or sealed in some but not in others.90 
It is difficult to offer guidance to legislators who wish to ameliorate but 
not eliminate the record consequences of the criminal process. To the 
extent that the reform is designed primarily to accomodate the presumed 
deterrent and symbolic value of the criminal penalty while reducing the 
cost of administering it, several devices are available. First, eliminating 
formal booking procedures will save police the time and arrestees the 
inconvenience associated with fingerprinting and photography. Persons 
apprehended could simply be issued citations to appear in court. In 
addition, two basic approaches involving various degrees of destigmatiza-
tion are available to adjust the severity of the record consequences to the 
less serious nature of the offense: expunging or sealing records im-
mediately after conviction or expunging or sealing the records after expi-
ration ofa stipulated period of time. Either of these two approaches could 
be supplemented with the right to state the nonexistence of any arrest or 
conviction for a criminal offense to employers or other questioners. 
The choice among immediate or postponed expungement or sealing 
depends upon how the legislature balances the presumed deterrent effect 
of the criminal penalty against the unfairness of stigmatizing minor 
marijuana offenders. If the legislature is seriously concerned about ad-
verse economic effects of criminalization, a crucial feature of the reform 
90 Under California law, possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is a citable mis-
demeanor punishable as an infraction. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ I 1357(b)-(c) (West 
Supp. 1977). Arrest and conviction do result in criminal records, but the offender is 
automatically entitled to petition for expungement of his record after two years from the date 
of conviction, or, if he is not convicted, after two years from the date of arrest. Id. at § 
11361.5. 
Under Colorado law, possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is a class two petty 
offense, a crime. While citations are mandatory, conviction results in a criminal record. The 
law includes no provision modifying the record consequences of conviction. Co Lo. REv. 
STAT. § 12-22-412(a) (Supp. 1977). 
In Minnesota, possession of I Y.z ounces or less of marijuana is punishable as a petty 
misdemeanor. While citations are not mandatory, records are not accessible on the same 
terms as criminal records. Instead, the law requires the courts to send a report of conviction 
to the Department of Public Safety which is required to retain a private, nonpublic record for 
no more than two years; this nonpublic record is solely for the courts' use in determining the 
applicability of penalties for subsequent offenses by the same offender. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 
152.15(5) (West Supp. 1977). 
North Carolina law did little more than preclude incarceration of first offenders. N.C. 
Gm. STAT.§§ 90-95(d)(4) as amended by Act of 1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws. The 
legislature did not alter any of the stigmatizing consequences of the criminal process. 
Possession of less than one ounce remains a misdemeanor, and only those first offenders 
who apply for conditional discharge and comply with the conditions are entitled to ex-
pungement. Id., §§ 90-96. 
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should be to permit the offender to deny any criminal arrests in connec-
tion with employment inquiries. To be effective, the remedy should take 
effect immediately after arrest. 
The central consideration in choosing between expunging and sealing 
the records is whether future access to the records is considered neces-
sary for certain limited purposes, such as research needs. If penalties are 
to be increased for subsequent offenses by the same offender, immediate 
expungement could not be employed. If a sealing provision is enacted, 
however, measures should be taken to prevent unauthorized dissemina-
tion by removing information identifying offenders or segregating sealed 
files and restricting access to them. 91 
A legislative decision to retain the stigmatizing consequences of 
marijuana violations should be carefully considered. Quite apart from the 
interrelated notions of proportionality and fairness noted earlier, potent 
utilitarian arguments may be interposed against efforts to derive deterrent 
and symbolic benefits from the imposition of criminality. Scholars have 
argued, for example, that the moralizing value of the criminal sanction 
may be diluted by its application to minor, widely committed offenses. 92 
"The ends of the criminal sanction are dis served," Herbert Packer 
claimed, "if the notion becomes widespread that being convicted of a 
crime is no worse than coming down with a bad cold."93 Although this 
hypothesis is not easily tested, the oft-repeated assertion that marijuana 
law enforcement generates disrespect for law signifies its plausibility. 
Already, bar examiners, medical licensing boards, colleges, graduate 
schools, and other licensing and screening agencies are routinely con-
fronted by applicants who have been convicted of marijuana offenses but 
seek to escape the customary consequences of criminality. 94 When the 
91 Among the civil offense jurisdictions, Alaska, Maine, and Oregon do not increase the 
penalty for subsequent offenses; therefore, there are no specific provisions for the mainten-
ance of records. Mississippi and New York provide for increased penalties for second and 
subsequent offenses. Mississippi, adopting a law similar to a Minnesota provision provides 
for a "private, non-public record" maintained by the Bureau of Narcotics. Compare Miss. 
CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1977) with MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 152.15(5) (West 
Supp. 1977). In New York, on the other hand, the legislature failed to enact provisions 
concerning maintenance of records for purposes of assessing applicability of the increased 
penalty provisions; instead, the act provides for expungement of cases adjourned in con-
templation of dismissal if no arrest occurs within one year. The absence of a systematic 
recordkeeping system has left judges unequipped to apply the increased penalty provisions 
which are, as a result, being ingored altogether. See Molotsky, Marijuana: A Cloud of 
Misinformation and Lighter Penalties, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1977 at 36, col. 2. 
92 See H. PACKER, supra note 49; Walker, Caution: Some Thoughts About the Penal 
Involvement Rate, in PROGRESS IN PENAL REFORM (1974). 
93 H. PACKER, supra note 49, at 261 (1968). 
94 Regarding the impact of marijuana arrests or convictions on admission to the bar, see 
generally Neisser, Draft Refusal, Marijuana and Bar Admission, 57 A.B.A.J. 140 (1971): 
Note, The Good Moral Character Requirement For Admission to The Bar .. 4 U.S. F.V. L. 
REv. 317 ( 1975); Note, Recent Developments in the Character and Fitness Qualification For 
the Practice of Law, 40 B. EXAMINER 4 (1971). See also In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 493 P.2d 
97, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1972), where the California Supreme Court imposed only a one year 
suspension and one additional year's probation on an attorney who had participated in a 
marijuana smuggling scheme and had served 90 days in jail. "Possession or use of mauijuana 
is, of course, unlawful, but measured by the morals of the day, its possession or use does not 
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social meaning of a disapproved behavior is severed from the presump-
tion of immorality, perpetuation of stigmatizing penalties may serve only 
to undermine the social meaning of the sanction itself. 
C. The Imposition of Noncriminal 
or Less Criminal Sanctions 
Whether or not the sanctioning process generates criminal record con-
sequences, several operational questions are raised regarding the admin-
istration of the residual penalty: the amount of any fine, the consequences 
of nonpayment, and the structure of any educational program. 
If a fine is chosen as the sanction for least serious consumption-related 
behavior, there are a number of reasons for limiting the maximum fine to 
an amount comparable to the penalty for a serious traffic offense, $100, 
for example. First, there is no evidence that the deterrent effect will differ 
according to the amount of the fine once it reaches a certain nonnuisance 
level, $25 for example. Second, symbolic effects are retained by any fine, 
regardless of the amount, as long as it is not de minimis. Third, the 
practical and legal difficulties associated with administering the sanction, 
discussed below, are mitigated if the amount of the fine is held to a 
minimum.95 
The administration of a financial penalty for marijuana offenses raises 
several important issues. The most efficient way to collect a fine, of 
course, is to insist upon payment immediately after apprehension and 
conviction. However, any procedure for enforcement of payment, even 
against defendants who are in fact able to pay, must provide an initial 
hearing to determine ability to pay. Although the Supreme Court has not 
fully described the procedural requirements of this hearing, it seems likely 
that they include the right to counsel and the right to present witnesses in 
support of a claim of indigency. 96 Moreover, it has been held that, prior to 
the indigency hearing, the defendant cannot be confined. 97 
[involve moral turpitude per se] or indicate that an attorney is unable to meet the profes-
sional and fiduciary duties of his practice." Id. at 572, 493 P.2d at 103, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 871. 
A federal district court recently held that the United States Civil Service Commission 
cannot dismiss a federal employee for the private occasional use of marijuana without 
showing that this habit had some deleterious effect on his work. Plaintiff, a supply clerk at 
the Veterans Administration Health Center in Philadelphia, had been dismissed after admit-
ting that he had used marijuana in the evenings and on weekends for three years. 
MacEahron v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 76-1667 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 1977). 
95 Under current reform statutes, the maximum fine for first offenses of the least serious 
behavior is $100 in Alaska, California, Colorado, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, and Oregon. Only Maine ($200) and Mississippi ($250) provide a higher maximum 
amount, and only Mississippi appears to provide a minimum figure ($100). Data have not 
been systematically collected concerning the amounts of fines actually being assessed by 
judges in the reformjurisdictions, but anecdotal information suggests that the average fine is 
$60 in California and $25 in Columbus, Ohio. See 3 GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT 
supra note 42, at 159, 168. 
96 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); 
Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1974) (three-judge court). 
97 Tucker v. Montgomery Bd. of Commissioners, 410 F. Supp. 494, 510 (M.D. Ala. 1976) 
(three-judge court). 
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If a defendant is judged able to make immediate payment and refuses to 
do so, or if he is given a reasonable opportunity to pay the fine consistent 
with his financial situation and he fails to take advantage of this opportun-
ity, he can be incarcerated for a period of time, although the constitutional 
limits of this period are not yet settled.98 It is no longer constitutional, 
however, to imprison a defendant who is financially unable to pay his 
fine. 99 Such a defendant must be allowed a period of time that affords him 
a realistic opportunity, under the circumstances of his case, to make 
payment through installments or otherwise. Ioo 
An alternative means of collecting fines from indigent defendants is to 
require them to report for work on some public project for the number of 
days necessary to satisfy the fine, although this approach also may in-
volve constitutional problems to the extent that the work is perceived as 
custody. If this method of payment is presented as an alternative to 
installment payment, however, it may simplify collection from defendants 
who are tempted to use present indigency as an excuse for future non-
payment. 
The best method of dealing with the problem of indigency is to permit 
judges to offer any person who pleads inability to pay the option of 
performing some public service involving an equivalent sacrifice of time. 
This approach can also be employed in cases involving offenders whose 
drug involvement is significant enough to suggest that participation in 
some educational program would be beneficial. If such programs have an 
educative effect at all, that effect is likely to be greater to the extent that 
the defendant's participation is voluntary. If defendants are given the 
realistic choice of either paying the fine or attending the program, those 
who enter the program will be attending, at least in part, of their own 
volition and will be much more likely to benefit. 
If the preferred sanction is an educational program rather than a fine, it 
should resemble, in terms of time and convenience, the driver education 
program required for youthful violators or multiple adult offenders. Ex-
perience with drug education programs clearly indicates that the objective 
cannot be to teach participants about the evils of marijuana use. I 0 I In-
stead, the objective must be to instill responsible and mature attitudes 
toward the use of psychoactive substances, including both marijuana and 
98 Commonwealth ex rel. Parrish v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973); State ex rel. 
Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N.W.2d 778 (1972). 
99 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
100 When a defendant, through no fault of his own, is unable to make payments under a 
plan providing a reasonable opportunity to do so, one court suggested that imprisonment 
based solely on inability to pay would deprive the poor of equal protection of the laws. 
Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Mo. 1972); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO 
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, § 6.5(b), 288-89. Another court, however, 
suggested that discharge of an indigent defendant, while other defendants are forced to pay a 
penalty, would deprive the affluent defendant of equal protection. State v. DeBonis, 58 N .J. 
182, 198-199, 276 A.2d 137, 146-47 (1971). This difficult case is unlikely to occur often, 
however, if courts utilize their discretionary powers to reduce fines and postpone payments 
for defendants without means. 
101 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: 
PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 347-59 (1973). 
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alcohol. The Minnesota educational program for marijuana offenders 
follows this model. 102 A mandatory leverage sanction, applied in lieu ofa 
fine in all cases involving the least serious consumption-related behavior, 
amounts to legislative overkill. 103 On the other hand, it should be em-
phasized that an educational program may be a useful optional sanction 
for persons unable to pay the fine, and it may also be an appropriate 
dispositional alternative for some repeat offenders104 or youthful vio-
lators. The latter situations, however, involve generic questions regarding 
the desirability of different, more burdensome sanctions for subsequent 
offenses and violations by minors. 
D. Should Penalties Be Increased 
For Subsequent Offenses? 
Assuming a state has decided to decriminalize some marijuana behavior 
and to impose a civil fine for these least serious offenses, the question 
arises whether the sanction applied should vary with the number of such 
offenses committed by the same offender. There are three alternatives: to 
retain the same penalty for subsequent offenses as for first offenses; to 
impose a larger fine for subsequent offenses; or to apply more severe 
criminal sanctions for subsequent offenses, in the form of stigmatizing 
record consequences, incarceration, or both. 
Again, the rationale which underlies the initial decision to reform the 
marijuana prohibitions will affect the evaluation of possible alternatives. 
If the legislature wishes to minimize the involvement of marijuana users in 
the criminal system because of its concern about the fairness of enforce-
ment and the disproportionality of criminal sanction to the offense, then it 
makes little sense to alter the nature of the penalty for second offen-
ders.105 Only an increase in the fine would comport with the goals of 
decriminalization, and the cost of retaining and searching records is 
hardly warranted by any increased deterrent effect. On the other hand, if 
the legislators' primary goal is simply to decrease the cost of enforcing 
102 See note 72 and accompanying text supra. Bloom, An Approach For Casual Drug 
Users, Technical Paper of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, Department of Health 
Education and Welfare 6-9 (1977). 
103 Under the Minnesota statute, a first offender is punishable by participation in the drug 
education program unless the court enters a written finding that such a program is inappro-
priate. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 152.15(2)(5) (West Supp. 1977). A second offender within two 
years must be evaluated for chemical dependency and can be ordered to participate in a 
treatment program. The Mississippi law is similar. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-29-139(d)(2) 
(1977). 
10
• In California, a person charged with possession of up to one ounce who has been 
previously convicted of this offense three times within a two-year period, must be diverted 
to an educational or treatment program in lieu of being fined. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE 
§ 11357(b) (West Supp. 1977). 
105 If the legislature has decided that a first offender should receive only a civil fine, it 
seems patently unfair, especially in light of the high degree of selectivity and arbitrariness 
prevalent in marijuana law enforcement, to apply the full panoply of criminal sanctions-
with the embarassment of arrest and booking, the economic and social consequences of 
having a record, and especially incarceration-merely because a casual marijuana user has 
been unlucky enough to have been caught a second time. 
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marijuana prohibitions while retaining maximum preventive effects, then 
imposing penalties for subsequent offenses may be a rational course. 
Such an approach is not without cost, however. Apart from the costs of 
processing and punishing repeat offenders, increased penalties also re-
quire retention of records of initial violations in order to determine 
whether a violator is a second offender. 
The costs of enforcement will be substantially increased if the legisla-
ture authorizes imprisonment rather than civil fines for subsequent of-
fenses. Aside from the obvious expense of incarceration, one principal 
advantage of the fine-only scheme, the elimination of costly trials, will be 
lost if incarceration is authorized, because defendants will be less likely to 
plead guilty if they face possible confinement. The threat of imprisonment 
may also engender more technical search and seizure claims both at trial 
and on appeal, all of which will operate to drain already scarce judicial 
resources. Even a criminal sanction which excludes imprisonment will 
add significantly to the cost of deterring marijuana behavior. More formal 
procedures will have to be utilized during arrest because the offender 
must be brought to the station, fingerprinted, and photographed; criminal 
records will have to be maintained; some defendants may be inclined to 
contest the charge either to avoid the higher fine or the criminal stigma; 
and notions of procedural fairness may require that publicly paid counsel 
be offered to indigent offenders. 106 
Apart from considerations of fairness and cost, the legislature may wish 
to evaluate the possible utility of the sanctioning system as a leverage 
device in cases involving recidivists. Repeated apprehension for 
marijuana offenses may indicate, in some cases, that the individ_ual has 
progressed beyond purely recreational use of marijuana to a more inten-
sified pattern of psychoactive drug use. Nonetheless, a judicious use of 
discretion to utilize optional educational or counseling programs is a more 
efficacious way of dealing with this problem than the enactment of 
categorical increases in sanctions for subsequent offenses. 
Whether for reasons of fairness or efficiency, six of the ten states which 
have decriminalized least serious marijuana behavior do not enhance the 
penalty for subsequent offenses. 107 However, legislators in the four other 
reform jurisdictions have apparently been persuaded that the incremental 
deterrent effects of more severe penalties justify the cost of imposing 
them on repeat offenders. Threatened penalties for second offenses vary 
widely: the fine is merely doubled in New York;108 a large fine and up to 
106 Appointed counsel is not constitutionally mandated if imprisonment is not authorized. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Legislators may decide, however, that indigent 
defendants who are subject to criminal liability should be represented by appointed counsel. 
107 Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Ohio, and Oregon. 
108 New York provides a graduated scheme of sanctions for subsequent violations within 
a three year period. Possession of 25 grams or less of marijuana constitutes a violation, 
punishable for a first offense by a maximum fine of $100, for a second offense by a fine of up 
to $200, and for a third offense by a fine of up to $250 and/or 15 days in jail. Marijuana 
Reform Act, ch. 360, § 221.05, 1977 N.Y. Laws 500. 
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60 days may be imposed in Mississippi, although the violator earns no 
criminal record;109 and criminal fines and jail terms of three months and 
six months may be imposed in Minnesota"0 and North Carolina,'" 
respectively. 
E. Applicability to Minors 
A further question raised by the decriminalization of marijuana is 
whether the reforms should recognize a distinction between juvenile and 
adult offenders. The same legislator who does not object to reducing the 
penalty for possession for personal use to a fine paid by mail when the 
offender is an adult, may wish to grant jurisdiction to the juvenile court 
when the offender is a minor. The issue is whether decriminalizing pos-
session of marijuana for personal use will require a change in the defini-
tion of juvenile delinquency in order to allow possession of marijuana to 
remain an allegation sufficient to support a juvenile delinquency peti-
tion.112 
Some states have reduced the criminal penalties for possession and sale 
of small amounts of marijuana, while continuing to label such acts as 
criminal. In these states, no change in the definition of juvenile delin-
quency is necessary to support continued intervention in the case of 
juveniles, because the commission of an act by a minor which is criminal 
if committed by an adult is sufficient to give the juvenile court jurisdic-
tion. If the legislature does not label this conduct a crime, however, 
juvenile courtjurisdiction would have to be based on the court's authority 
10
• In Mississippi, first offenders are issued a citation similar to a traffic ticket, and are 
subject to a civil fine. Second offenders within a two-year period face a possible jail 
sentence of 5 to 60 days, a mandatory fine of $250 and possibly court-ordered participation 
in a drug education program. Third time offenders within a two year period face a possible 
jail sentence of 5 to 60 days, a mandatory fine of $250 to $500 and a misdemeanor criminal 
record. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1977). 
110 In Minnesota, the first offense of possessing 1 l--2 ounces or less is a petty misdemeanor 
punishable by a maximum fine of $100 and possibly by court-ordered participation in a four 
to eight hour drug-education course. However, a second or subsequent offense within two 
years is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of$300, a criminal record, and ajail 
term up to 90 days. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 152.15(2)(5) (West Supp. 1977); 3 GOVERNORS' 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 235 (1977). 
111 North Carolina stipulates a maximum fine of $100 for the first violation of possession 
of marijuana up to one ounce or one-tenth ounce of hashish. Subsequent offenses carry 
penalties of a maximum $500 fine and/or 6 months in jail. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-95(d)(4) as 
amended by Act of 1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws. 
112 M. PAULSEN & c. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 32 (1974) indicate 
that juvenile court jurisdiction may extend to four types of cases: where the juvenile has 
allegedly committed an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult; where the child 
is allegedly beyond the control of his parents or is engaging in conduct which, though not 
criminal, is thought to be deleterious to his health and welfare; where the youth's paren'ts, 
though able to offer proper care and guidance, allegedly fail to do so; and where the child's 
parents are allegedly unable to care for him. Although possession of marijuana will clearly 
not support juvenile court intervention in the last two situations, this conduct may support 
jurisdiction in the first two situations, depending upon the type of marijuana reform law 
enacted and upon the statutory definition of juvenile delinquency. 
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to entertain petitions alleging noncriminal conduct by a child injurious to 
his health, welfare, or morals, 113 although it is questionable whether 
occasional marijuana use would support such a petition. 114 If the stat-
utory definition of juvenile delinquency is more narrowly drawn and does 
not include this broad category, 115 juvenile court jurisdiction will not 
extend to cases involving noncriminal possession of marijuana. In these 
states, the legislator who wishes the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction in 
such cases either must amend the juvenile delinquency definition to 
include possession and sale of even small amounts of marijuana or must 
include in the marijuana decriminalization bill a statement that possession 
of marijuana for personal use by a juvenile supports juvenile court juris-
diction. Even in the states where the statutory definition of juvenile 
delinquency encompasses conduct injurious to health or morals, the legis-
lature will be well advised to address the matter explicitly in the marijuana 
legislation. 
If the legislature decides that greater intervention in the case of juvenile 
offenders is desirable, it may wish to specify precisely what kind of 
disposition is permissible. For example, it is doubtful that a legislature 
which adopts a fine-only policy for adults would intend to permit con-
finement in a reformatory for a juvenile engaging in the very same activ-
ity. The legislature may well decide, however, that appearance in juvenile 
court should be mandatory or that attendance at a drug education course 
is appropriate. Alternatively, the legislature may wish to specify that, 
although confinement may not be authorized for noncriminal possession 
alone, such activity is one factor to be assessed along with others in 
determining whether confinement is justified. While many possible dis-
positions, either mandatory or discretionary, are conceivable, the impor-
tant point is that the legislature should not leave its intention unexpres-
sed. 
113 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:4-14(m) (1952). This statute was upheld against a challenge on 
vagueness grounds. State v. L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970), affd 57 N.J. 
165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971). Most statutes of this kind have 
survived due process attacks. M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 112, at 48-49. 
114 Proponents of the repeal of status offense jurisdiction frequently assert that juvenile 
courts currently assume jurisdiction in cases involving possession of alcohol and tobacco, 
even though these acts are not illegal and would not support a delinquency petition. See, 
e.g., ABA INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PRO-
JECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, 35, 41 (Tenative Draft 1977). 
Even if the jurisdiction is not abolished, the pressure to reform or abolish status offenses 
may lead appellate courts to give the vague statutory language an interpretive gloss which 
precludes jurisdiction in cases involving possession of alcohol and tobacco. If marijuana use 
were decriminalized, the courts might preclude jurisdiction on the same ground. 
115 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 600-602 (West Supp. 1977): 
§ 602. Minor violating laws defining crime; minors failing to obey court order 
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this 
state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state 
defining crime ... other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on 
age. is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person 
to be a ward of the court. (emphasis original). 
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IV. MODIFYING THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: 
DETECTION AND POSTARREST CONSEQUENCES 
In addition to selecting the appropriate postconviction sanctions for 
least serious marijuana behavior, legislators supporting decriminalization 
will also want to modify police behavior in detecting offenses and arrest-
ing violators; and postarrest processing by police, prosecutors, and 
courts. For those who believe that society's interest in suppressing 
marijuana use does not warrant the invasion of privacy and deprivation of 
liberty normally implicit in the criminal process, a central goal of de-
criminalization will be to minimize the offender's involvement in the 
criminal justice system. However, procedural reform is a necessary goal 
even for those who seek mainly to reduce the amount of criminal justice 
resources allocated to marijuana cases. 
Assuming that the legislature has decided to enact a decriminalization 
scheme which removes incarceration as an authorized penalty for the 
least serious marijuana behavior, four procedural issues must be ad-
dressed from both constitutional and policy perspectives: the extent to 
which police search authority is affected by decriminalization; the cir-
cumstances under which a person may be taken into custody and detained 
after apprehension; whether the offender may be required to appear in 
court; and, if the case is contested, the types of procedures and 
safeguards which should be employed during the adjudication. 
A. Detection 
In addition to the considerations of personal liberty, fairness, institu-
tional integrity, and conservation of criminal justice resources discussed 
above in the context of postconviction consequences, reform-minded 
legislators may also be concerned with the protection of individual pri-
vacy. Even if legislative reform prevents severe deprivations of liberty 
after conviction, marijuana users may still be subjected to serious inva-
sions of privacy associated with arrest, detention, and search procedures. 
Legislators who doubt the legitimacy of coercive efforts designed to 
suppress marijuana use will be inclined to remove all legal sanctions for 
possession of less than the designated amount, thereby eliminating the 
indignities associated with being stopped, searched, arrested, and de-
tained. Although the marijuana itself will still be subject to seizure as 
contraband under federal law, 116 a state could modify its own contraband 
provisions or rules of criminal procedure to restrict the occasions for 
legitimate police searches for small quantities of marijuana. 
As noted above, however, legislators may retain some civil penalty in 
the belief that removal of all sanctions from consumption-related act_ivity 
is inconsistent with society's interest in discouraging marijuana use. 
These legislators are relying mainly on the presumed symbolic effects of 
116 See MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 152-54, 165-66, for a discus-
sion of the contraband issue. 
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the legal penalty, rather than the anticipated deterrent effects. Since the 
probability of detection is relatively low even under an active enforce-
ment strategy, much enforcement activity actually wastes resources, and 
it might be more efficient to attempt to reduce the level of enforcement 
under a civil offense statutory scheme. While aiming for a credible threat 
of detection for public use and flagrant possessory violations, lawmakers 
should strive to accommodate privacy interests by discouraging unneces-
sarily zealous and intrusive law enforcement efforts. Destigmatization 
and passive enforcement represent complementary strategies for tailoring 
the sanctioning process to its most efficient and fairest use in the effort to 
contain marijuana consumption. 
Empirical studies have consistently shown that most drug arrests are 
warrantless and that the police frequently operate on the fringes of con-
stitutional limitations. 117 If the legislature wishes to minimize the inva-
sions of privacy which ordinarily attend discovery of a minor marijuana 
violation, the crucial question is whether detection of such an offense 
should provide the legal basis for a search of the violator's person or 
property. For example, warrantless searches of an offender's person and 
the area under his immediate control can ordinarily be conducted incident 
to a lawful arrest, in order to prevent him from either obtaining a weapon 
or destroying evidence while he is in custody .118 To authorize a full 
search, the arrest must be based on a probable cause, and it must be a 
full-custody arrest which includes transportation to the stationhouse for 
booking, or any equivalent prolonged contact with the suspect. 119 In 
many jurisdictions a search of a suspect upon arrest is routine and may 
even be required by departmental regulations. 120 
Because the authority to search depends upon the fact of detention, 
both privacy and liberty may be protected by prohibiting full-custody 
arrests for decriminalized offenses. A citation procedure, discussed be-
low, should suffice for the apprehension of most offenders. There may be 
occasions when prolonged detention is unavoidable, but these situations 
can be handled by specific exceptions to a general statutory rule that a 
noncriminal offender should not be subjected to a full-custody arrest121 
117 See, e.g., Johnson and Bogomolny, Selective Justice: Drug Law Enforcement in Six 
American Cities. in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE 
IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, App. Vol. III 498-547 (1973). 
118 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
119 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
120 LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The 
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 131; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT 
PROCEDURE 493 (1975). 
121 The Robinson opinion, which approved police authority to conduct a full personal 
search whenever they make a full-custody arrest, did not define that term, and the case itself 
involved an arrest plus booking; however, since the decision was rationalized on the ground 
that a search is necessary to protect policemen from attack with a hidden weapon during 
prolonged contact with a suspect, it seems clear that a search incident to any form of 
detention that requires the policeman to drive the suspect in his squad car will be upheld as 
reasonable. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221-23 n.2; LaFave, supra note 120, at 
148, 152. 
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and should not be detained longer than necessary for citation purposes. 122 
Another important question is whether the police ought to be discour-
aged from seeking out minor marijuana offenses, especially in private 
locations. The demonstrable trend in recent years has been for drug 
investigative units to adopt a relatively passive stance toward possession 
offenses, 123 and the mere decision to decrease the penalty for marijuana 
offenses may influence the police to place an even lower priority on 
detecting them, thereby conserving police resources as well as protecting 
personal privacy. But the legislature may wish to place formal limitations 
on the power of police to search property by regulating the authority of 
magistrates to issue search warrants and the authority of police to make 
warrantless searches. 
Traditionally, a suspect person and property cannot be searched 
against his will unless a search warrant, describing the place to be 
searched and the things to be seized, has been issued upon probable 
cause. When the object to be seized is marijuana, the primary require-
ment for the issuance of a search warrant is a showing of probable cause 
that marijuana will be found in the place to be searched. A warrantless 
search may be made, where probable cause exists, if delay might result in 
loss of the evidence, for example, if the object to be seized is in a moving 
automobile. 124 Empirical studies consistently show that vehicle searches 
account for more than one-third of all drug possession arrests. 125 
If a legislature wishes to protect the property of persons who commit 
decriminalized offenses from these otherwise valid searches, a provision 
similar to the following could be enacted: 
A search warrant will not issue for the seizure of marijuana or of 
evidence in connection with a marijuana related offense, if the amount 
of marijuana to be seized is less than [the designated amount], or if the 
offense in question is [include reference to least serious offenses]. 
Furthermore, the presence on a person or premises of less than [the 
desginated amount] of marijuana, or the commission of [include refer-
122 For example, if an offender has inadequate identification, it may be necessary either to 
transport him to a magistrate, to post bond, or to detain him at the stationhouse until his 
identity has oeen established. Although neither of these procedures amounts to arrest for the 
purpose of authorizing a search, both require prolonged contact between officer and offen-
der. Since the occasions for such detention procedures and the searches incident to them 
cannot be eliminated, they should be held to a minimum and designated in the statute as 
exceptional situations. 
Once the legislature has made its judgment that marijuana offenders should not be 
routinely booked like other arrestees or, by implication, subjected to searches incident to 
full-<:ustody arrests, the police are unlikely to abuse their authority. If they do, however, the 
arrest may be an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment because, even though 
based on probable cause, it is unnecessary in order to insure an appearance in court. See 
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Ninth 
Circuit has held unconstitutional the arrest of a material witness and the forcible detention of 
a person wanted for questioning, where those procedures were unnecessary to secure the 
cooperation of the subjects. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (1971); United States v. 
Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (1973); see also LaFave, supra note 120, at 159-61. 
123 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at App. Vol II 626-42. 
124 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
125 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at App. Vol. II 634-36. 
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ence to least serous offenses], does not, in the absence of additional 
evidence of a substantial nature, constitute probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant authorizing the seizure of larger amounts 
of marijuana, or the se·izure of evidence in connection with more 
serious marijuana-related offenses; nor shall it constitute reasonable 
grounds, for purposes of an arrest, to believe that any marijuana 
offense other than [include reference to least serious offenses] has 
been committed. 
Note that such a provision applies to warrantless automobile searches 
as well as searches under warrant, because the legality of the former 
depends on the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant, even though no warrant is issued. The second sentence of the 
sample provision is designed to prevent searches and arrests in connec-
tion with more serious offenses from being made solely on the basis of 
evidence that the decriminalized offense was committed. This part of the 
provision is somewhat ambiguous, since it leaves open to case-by-case 
determination the question of how much additional evidence is needed. If 
additional protection is thought necessary, the legislature could prohibit 
searches of private homes unless there is probable cause to believe that 
the home is used for the sale of marijuana. 
B. Custody After Arrest 
If minor marijuana offenses are punishable by fine, the apprehending 
officer must be authorized to detain the offender long enough to issue a 
citation which explains the options for paying or contesting the fine. 
Whether any further custody should be authorized is a separate question. 
At one extreme, the statutory scheme could provide for full custody, with 
the marijuana offender treated like any felon or misdemeanant who, upon 
apprehension, may be fingerprinted, booked, and photographed. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the legislature could prohibit detention beyond 
the initial apprehension and issuance of a citation. Between these ex-
tremes lies a variety of options: there may be additional custody for the 
limited purpose of identification; full custody unless the defendant can 
post collateral; or discretion to invoke full custody if the defendant does 
not give adequate identification or has no local address. 
Any of these options will probably meet constitutional standards. At 
least two of the states which have adopted the Model Penal Code's civil 
violation concept also authorize arrest without a warrant and permit 
custody when an offense is committed in an officer's presence, 126 and, 
thu~ far, no constitutional challenges have been raised. It is arguable, 
however, that a state may not deprive a person of liberty during a process 
for penalizing the commission of an offense which has no criminal record 
consequences and is not punishable by a loss of liberty. Supreme Court 
decisions holding that summary seizure of property before an adjudica-
tion of liability is a denial of due process may preclude a state from 
126 CONN. STAT. ANN. § 6-49 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629. 34 (1947). 
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initiating an action for payment of a purely civil fine with a deprivation of 
personal liberty .127 On the other hand, the Court might conclude that the 
relatively minor deprivation of lib~rty occasioned by a full-custody arrest 
is not a denial of due process when the offense has been personally 
observed by the apprehending officer. The Court might also emphasize 
the state's interest in insuring that its civil and criminal prohibitions are 
enforced, and hold that taking the defendant into custody in order to 
guarantee either appearance at a subsequent trial or payment of a fine is a 
reasonable means of achieving that end. Since the Supreme Court has 
never addressed this issue, a definitive answer cannot be given. It is 
important to note, however, that authorizing full custody implicates val-
ues of constitutional dimension. This factor, when considered with others 
discussed below, may lead to a policy judgment that custody should not 
be authorized, irrespective of the merits of the constitutional challenge 
and irrespective of the severity of the postconviction record consequen-
ces of a violation. 
Mandating full custody for every offender apprehended clearly dis-
serves the twin goals of decriminalization. Full custody exacts significant 
costs in police resources, both in processing the offender at the time of 
arrest and in maintaining his records thereafter. Arrest and custody also 
serve as sanctions in themselves, regardless of the subsequent disposition 
of the case: the offender is subject to the potentially demeaning process of 
booking and the formal record of the arrest, as well as to the greater 
notoriety involved. 
In the vast majority of cases, therefore, the most efficacious procedure 
appears to be to permit intervention only to the degree necessary to issue 
a citation. In some cases, however, due to the failure of the defendant to 
provide either adequate identification or a local address, the officer may 
justifiably be concerned that the defendant will neither appear in court nor 
pay the fine; in such cases, a policy of allowing the officer discretion to 
bring the defendant into custody seems warranted. To be consistent with 
the twin goals of fairness and efficiency, the sole purpose of custody 
should be to obtain adequate identification. While the state admittedly has 
an interest in enforcing and collecting its civil penalties, it is doubtful that 
this need justifies further intervention. Once apprehended and identified, 
few individuals will later flee the jurisdiction to avoid going to court or 
paying the fine. The risk of avoidance is too slight to justify an elaborate 
custody procedure, especially when the decriminalization scheme applies 
only to the least serious marijuana-related behavior. 
C. Court Appearance 
Alternatives to requiring the defendant's appearance in court include, 
in_ decrt':asing degrees of intervention and cost: discretionary decisions 
127 See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); 
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
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regarding the need for court appearances by arresting officers, posting of 
collateral with forfeiture upon nonappearance, and payment of a fine by 
mail. The appearance requirement may be regarded as a reasonable 
means of implementing the policy of discouraging the use of marijuana. 
Appearance in court imposes a greater burden on the offender than mere 
payment by mail and, therefore, may impress upon him the relative 
seriousness of the official disapproval of his conduct. 128 On the other 
hand, removing these minor offenses from already severely overloaded 
state court dockets is one major reason behind the drive for decriminaliza-
tion. Whether the marginal deterrence to be derived from the court 
appearance is worth this extra cost in court time is an issue which 
policymakers must resolve. 129 
In the interest of effecting some cost savings, policymakers may be 
tempted to authorize the police to require court appearance in certain 
instances. The problem with this approach is that meaningful standards 
will be difficult to frame and will introduce additional sources of selective 
punishment, an evil partly responsible for diminishing the institutional 
integrity of the present marijuana proscriptions. Absent a clearly defined 
standard, legislators should mandate court appearance in all instances or 
in none. 130 
D. Adjudicatory Process 
Legislative choices about appropriate adjudicatory procedures are 
closely tied to the postconviction consequences discussed above. Once 
the criminal postconviction consequences of stigma and incarcerarion 
have been eliminated for marijuana violations, most defendants will not 
contest their guilt by seeking to suppress evidence or insisting upon an 
evidentiary trial. In fact, the defendant in such circumstances is not 
constitutionally entitled to the cumbersome and costly procedural 
safeguards designed to protect against unwarranted criminal convictions. 
On the other hand, if a conviction can result in incarceration or stigma, 
128 The fear of appearing in court may play a significant role in the deterrent process. A 
British Home Office survey of the attitudes of young men aged 15-21 years indicated that 
after family relations and job prospects, the public notoriety of having to appear in court 
ranked the highest among things that might worry people if they broke the law and were 
found out. See J. WILLCOCK, DETERRENTS AND INCENTIVES TO CRIME AMONG BOYS AND 
YOUNG MEN AGED 15-21 YEARS 46-53 (1968). 
129 The National Governors' Conference found that the states which did not require a 
court appearance realize substantial savings in terms of judicial and prosecutorial resources. 
See 2 GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 43-44. 
130 If the legislature chooses not to require court appearances at all, the choice between 
the final two alternatives is likely to be of little significance. Whether the scheme involves 
posting collateral followed by forfeiture for nonappearance or mailing the fine, most defen-
dants can be expected to forfeit the collateral or pay the fine rather than con.test the charge. 
Requiring payment of collateral before release may result in a greater number of fines being 
paid; however, this procedure seems to impose unfair burdens on those offenders who do 
not have available funds to post collateral. Payment of the fine may be encouraged by 
adopting a procedure which has been used in the collection of parking tickets: the fine is 
doubled if it is not paid or contested within a certain time following the violation, after which 
a civil proceeding may be brought to collect the judgment. 
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defendants will be more likely to invoke the procedural protections to 
which they are constitutionally entitled. 
The range of legislative choice is therefore fairly constricted. If the 
postconviction consequences have been decriminalized, the legislature 
will undoubtedly wish to capture the cost savings by providing summary 
procedures, much like those at traffic court. On the other hand, if the 
postconviction consequences remain more or less criminal, the legislature 
will have no choice but to utilize formal misdemeanor processes involving 
prosecutorial officials and probably defense attorneys. 
Several constitutional propositions establish the outer boundaries for 
the procedural choices available to the legislature. If the offense is 
punishable by incarceration, two important and costly procedural protec-
tions are required. The right to a court-appointed attorney arises only in 
cases where incarceration is likely to be imposed. 131 Therefore, even if 
the offense is labelled a crime and has not been destigmatized, the state 
may not be constitutionally required to provide indigents with state-paid 
counsel as long as imprisonment is not authorized. Similarly, the defen-
dant has no right to ajury trial if the potential sanction is imprisonment for 
less than six months132 or a small fine. 133 On the other hand, if the 
legislature reduces the penalty for the least serious marijuana-related 
behavior to a fine but retains the criminal label and adverse record 
consequences, the state must still establish some formal trial process, 
affording the defendant the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right 
not to have a verdict directed against him, and the right not to be tried for 
the same offense in another proceeding. 134 However, if the legislature 
labels the offense noncriminal and destigmatizes its record consequences, 
it can probably provide summary procedures without including these 
procedural rights. 
In summary, if the legislature classifies the least serious marijuana 
offense as a civil violation, punishable only by a fine 135 and without 
stigmat1zing record consequences, it may constitutionally provide sum-
mary adjudication procedures: the defendant will not be entitled to have 
131 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972): 
132 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
133 Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975). The Court in Muniz specifically reserved the 
question whether a severe fine might require jury trial. Id., at 477. 
134 Clarx, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional 
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 398 (1976). The Court has never determined whether the 
accused is also entitled to the additional sixth amendment rights to a speedy trial and to 
compulsory process or to the due process right to be tried under 'an evidentiary standard 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
135 Under prevailing constitutional jargon, the Supreme Court will probably determine 
that a purely civil fine is not punitive because the dominant purpose of the statute, derived 
from its legislative history or from the severity of the fine, is not to condemn. For a 
thoughtful review of the relevant cases, see Clark, supra note 134, at 411. But see Spevack 
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (revocation of professional license); Uniformed Sanitation Men 
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (loss of public employment); Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (loss of government contract) which indicate that even under 
summary procedures, the defendant cannot be deprived of his fifth amendment right to 
remain silent. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n. 3 (1938), quoting United States v. 
Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 50 (1914). 
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appointed counsel, to subpoena witnesses, to confront adverse witnesses, 
to put the state to a criminal burden of proof, or to be tried by a jury or 
legally trained judge. It should be added, of course, that the absence of a 
constitutional entitlement does not imply that the legislature should, as a 
matter of policy, establish purely summary procedures. This choice will 
depend, in part, on whether a summary court system, separate from the 
misdemeanor court system, such as a traffic court, is already established. 
If such a court exists, the legislature will undoubtedly want to expand its 
jurisdiction to cover these least serious marijuana offenses, according 
these defendants the same rights available to traffic defendants. On the 
other hand, if traffic cases are handled within the lower criminal court 
system, the accom~odation between efficiency and procedural rights will 
be made as a matter of practice, just as it is in more serious traffic cases. If 
the legislature or city council has defined a separate less formal set of 
procedures for petty traffic cases, it should simply enter a cross-reference 
in the decriminalization bill. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has considered the drafting implications of altenative 
rationales for enacting substantial revisions in traditional criminal penal-
ties for possession of marijuana for personal use. Different methods of 
defining the least serious offense and of formulating any residual sanc-
tions for such behavior have been analyzed in light of alternative policy 
premises and empirical assumptions._ 
The author has his own views, of course, and presumes the reader will 
not object if he states them briefly here. 136 First, traditional criminal 
penalties against marijuana use are indefensible on both retributive and 
utilitarian grounds. The retributive concerns about proportionality and 
fairness provide the overriding arguments for reform. Therefore, criminal · 
penalties should be withdrawn from all behavior which is clearly 
consumption-related rather than some more restricted category of con-
duct. Second, no residual sanctions should be imposed on decriminalized 
behavior, because the costs of applying them would exceed the social 
benefits attributed to their preventive effects. Third, even if a residual 
sanction is imposed, the main preventive effects would be symbolic, not 
deterrent, in nature; accordingly, the sanction should be a summarily 
administered civil fine. Each of these propositions will be defended 
briefly below. 
Prevention and containment of marijuana use is the presumptively 
legitimate objective of current policy; it is, in H.L.A. Hart's terminology, 
136 These views have remained consistent since first published in 1970. See Bonnie & 
Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal 
History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 57 VA. L. REV. 971, 1177-80 (1970); R. BONNIE 
& C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 298-304. 
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the "general justifying aim" of any implementing prohibitions and 
punishments. 137 Preventive justifications are qualified and limited, how-
ever, by retributive concepts such as proportionality, the principle that 
any punishments imposed may not be disproportionately severe in light of 
the seriousness of the offense. 138 Although full theoretical elaboration for 
the assertion cannot be provided here, the principle of proportionality 
does bar condemnatory punishments 139 for conduct like marijuana use, 
which the prevailing normative climate does not regard as inherently 
deserving of condemnation. Experts unanimously agree that moderate 
use of the drug is not harmful to the user's health or well-being and does 
not lead to socially undesirable behavior. 14° Consumption of marijuana is 
no longer regarded by informed opinion as morally distinguishable from 
the use of alcohol. Moreover, even polls of public opinion show that a 
majority of the adult population believes criminal penalties are inappro-
priate.141 Although a consensus of informed opinion supports continued 
disapproval and discouragement of use, the residual justification is reg-
ulatory in nature and depends on considerable speculation about the 
aggregate effects of consumption on the public health and welfare. Cur-
rent efforts to suppress moderat-e, recreational consumption are premised 
on the presumed direct associations between availability, overall con-
sumption, and excessive consumption. The success of prohibitions 
against simple consumption can be evaluated only by measuring the 
aggregate social effects of impaired individual functioning. 
Under such normative conditions, any penalty for personal use may be 
illegitimate. According to the libertarian arguments of Mill, H.L.A. Hart, 
and others, the state may not prohibit behavior which does not, in itself, 
have socially harmful effects; aggregated speculative effects are insuffi-
cient to support any coercive interventions. 142 For present purposes, 
however, the point is more limited: even if some penalty may be justifi-
able in utilitarian terms, that penalty may not be condemnatory in purpose 
or effect. From a theoretical standpoint, the condemnatory effects of 
alternative penalties are measured according to the social meaning of 
various processes and deprivations, reflected in the stigmatizing effects 
traditionally associated with sanctions denominated criminal. 
If criminal penalties for marijuana use are impermissible on retributive 
grounds, then such penalties should not be imposed on any consumption-
related behavior, and the line between decriminalized and other offenses 
must · at least approximate the border between unequivocably 
consumption-related behavior and behavior which is conceivably com-
mercial. 
137 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-11 (1968). 
138 Id. at 230-37. 
139 Although the line between criminal and noncriminal punishments is increasingly blur-
red, the essential difference, which ought to be preserved, lies in the condemnatory purpose, 
and associated stigmatizing effects, of criminal punishment. See Hart, The Aims of the 
Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 403 (1958). 
140 MARIHUANA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 90-91. 
141 See note 87 supra. 
142 See, e.g .. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963). 
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Whether or not one accepts the view that criminal penalties are barred 
on retributive grounds, stigmatizing penalties are also demonstrably inap-
propriate in utilitarian terms. The application of criminal sanctions gener-
ates social costs which can be measured in terms of actual enforcement 
costs, reduced social and economic productivity of stigmatized offenders, 
and the more amorphous crime-generating impact of reduced respect for 
law which far exceed the preventive benefits of criminal sanctions com-
pared with noncriminal ones. 
The question whether a noncriminal penalty is warranted must be 
explored in utilitarian terms. The National Commission, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws, and the author 
are persuaded that society's presumed interest in discouraging marijuana 
use is adequately served by a prohibition against commercial activity and 
that the incremental preventive effect of any penalty against 
consumption-related behavior is not warranted by the costs of enforcing 
the prohibition and punishing violators. Accordingly, in the author's 
view, a decriminalization bill should simply revise the definition of pro-
hibited acts so that possession or private use of small amounts, perhaps 
up to 100 grams, of marijuana or hashish is not a punishable offense. 
A legislature may reasonably believe, however, that the preventive 
effects of a prohibition are substantial enough to warrant some penalty 
against consumption-related behavior. Any such preventive effects are 
attributable mainly to the symbolic force of the mere expression of illegal-
ity, although a fifty dollar fine may also have a direct and measurable 
effect on behavior by channeling use into private locations. These preven-
tive effects can be captured without invoking any of the customary 
consequences of the criminal sanction; however, the offense should be 
explicitly classified as a civil violation or infraction, and apprehension or 
payment of the fine should have no derivative legal or economic conse-
quences. Persons apprehended for a decriminalized offense should be 
issued citations and should not be subject to a full-custody arrest. A court 
appearance should be required only for minors, and the sole penalty 
should be a small fine, twenty-five or fifty dollars, payable by mail. If the 
legislature believes that such a penalty exerts an inadequate deterrent, a 
court appearance should be required for all violators. Penalties should not 
be enhanced for subsequent offenses. The definition of decriminalized 
offenses should encompass all clearly consumption-related behavior in-
volving any natural cannabis products except the liquid concentrate. In 
defining consumption-related behavior, the legislature ought to rely on 
specified amounts, classifying as infractions conduct such as possession 
or private use of 100 grams or less, distribution of one-half ounce or less, 
and cultivation of ten plants or less. 
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